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Abstract
We consider election scenarios with incomplete information, a situation that arises often in
practice. There are several models of incomplete information and accordingly, different notions
of outcomes of such elections. In one well-studied model of incompleteness, the votes are given by
partial orders over the candidates. In this context we can frame the problem of finding a possible
winner, which involves determining whether a given candidate wins in at least one completion of
a given set of partial votes for a specific voting rule.
The Possible Winner problem is well-known to be NP-complete in general, and it is in fact
known to be NP-complete for several voting rules where the number of undetermined pairs in every
vote is bounded only by some constant. In this paper, we address the question of determining
precisely the smallest number of undetermined pairs for which the Possible Winner problem
remains NP-complete. In particular, we find the exact values of t for which the Possible Winner
problem transitions to being NP-complete from being in P, where t is the maximum number of
undetermined pairs in every vote. We demonstrate tight results for a broad subclass of scoring
rules which includes all the commonly used scoring rules (such as plurality, veto, Borda, k-
approval, and so on), Copelandα for every α ∈ [0, 1], maximin, and Bucklin voting rules. A
somewhat surprising aspect of our results is that for many of these rules, the Possible Winner
problem turns out to be hard even if every vote has at most one undetermined pair of candidates.
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1 Introduction
In many real life situations including multiagent systems, agents often need to aggregate
their preferences and agree upon a common decision (candidate). Voting is an immediate
natural tool in these situations. Common and classic applications of voting in multiagent
systems include collaborative filtering and recommender systems [20], spam detection [9],
computational biology [13], winner determination in sports competition [5] etc. We refer the
readers to [19] for an elaborate treatment of computational voting theory.
Usually, in a voting setting, it is assumed that the votes are complete orders over the
candidates. However, due to many reasons, for example, lack of knowledge of voters about
some candidates, a voter maybe indifferent between some pairs of candidates. Hence, it is
both natural and important to consider scenarios where votes are partial orders over the
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candidates. When votes are only partial orders over the candidates, the winner cannot be
determined with certainty since it depends on how these partial orders are extended to
linear orders. This leads to a natural computational problem called the Possible Winner
problem [15]: given a set of partial votes P and a distinguished candidate c, is there a way
to extend the partial votes to complete votes where c wins? The Possible Winner problem
has been studied extensively in the literature [17, 21, 22, 24, 7, 8, 4, 1, 16, 12] following
its definition in [15]. Betzler et al. [6] and Baumeister et al. [2] show that the Possible
Winner winner problem is NP-complete for all scoring rules except for the plurality and
veto voting rules; the Possible Winner winner problem is in P for the plurality and veto
voting rules. The Possible Winner problem is known to be NP-complete for many common
voting rules, for example, a class of scoring rules, maximin, Copeland, Bucklin etc. even
when the maximum number of undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote is bounded
above by small constants [24]. Walsh showed that the Possible Winner problem can be
solved in polynomial time for all the voting rules mentioned above when we have a constant
number of candidates [22].
1.1 Our Contribution
Our main contribution lies in pinning down exactly the minimum number of undetermined
pairs allowed per vote so that the Possible Winner winner problem continues to be
NP-complete for a large class of scoring rules, Copelandα, maximin, and Bucklin voting rules.
To begin with, we describe our results for scoring rules. We work with a class of scoring rules
that we call smooth, which are essentially scoring rules where the score vector for (m+ 1)
candidates can be obtained by either duplicating an already duplicated score in the score
vector for m candidates, or by extending the score vector for m candidates at one of the
endpoints with an arbitrary new value. While less general than the class of pure scoring
rules, the smooth rules continue to account for all commonly used scoring rules (such as
Borda, plurality, veto, k-approval, and so on). Using t to denote the maximum number of
undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote, we show the following.
– The Possible Winner problem is NP-complete even when t 6 1 for scoring rules which
have two distinct nonzero differences between consecutive coordinates in the score vector
(we call them differentiating) and in P when t 6 1 for other scoring rules [Theorem 6].
– Else the Possible Winner problem is NP-complete when t > 2 and in P when t 6 1 for
scoring rules that contain (α+ 1, α+ 1, α) for any α ∈ N [Theorem 8].
– Else the Possible Winner problem is NP-complete when t > 3 and in P when t 6 2 for
scoring rules which contain (α+ 2, α+ 1, α+ 1, α) for any α ∈ N [Theorem 9].
– The Possible Winner problem is NP-complete when t > 4 and in P when t 6 3 for
k-approval and k-veto voting rules for any k > 1 [Theorem 10].
– The Possible Winner problem is NP-complete when t > m−1 and in P when t 6 m−2
for the scoring rule (2, 1, 1, . . . , 1, 0) [Theorem 10].
We summarize our results for the Copelandα, maximin, and Bucklin voting rules in
Table 1. We observe that the Possible Winner problem for the Copelandα voting rule
is NP-complete even when every vote has at most 2 undetermined pairs of candidates for
α ∈ {0, 1}. However, for α ∈ (0, 1), the Possible Winner problem for the Copelandα voting
rule is NP-complete even when every vote has at most 1 undetermined pairs of candidates.
Our results show that the Possible Winner winner problem continues to be NP-complete
for all the common voting rules studied here (except k-approval) even when the number of
undetermined pairs of candidates per vote is at most 2. Other than finding the exact number
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of undetermined pairs needed per vote to make the Possible Winner problem NP-complete
for common voting rules, we also note that all our proofs are much simpler and shorter than
most of the corresponding proofs from the literature subsuming the work in [24, 6, 2].
Voting rules NP-complete Poly time Known from literature [24]
Copeland0,1 t > 2 [Theorem 11] t 6 1 [Theorem 12]
NP-complete for t > 8Copelandα
α ∈ (0, 1) t > 1 [Theorem 15] –
Maximin t > 2 [Theorem 17] t 6 1 [Theorem 18] NP-complete for t > 4
Bucklin t > 2 [Theorem 19] t 6 1 [Theorem 19] NP-complete for t > 16?
Table 1 Summary and comparison of results from the literature for Copelandα, maximin, and
Bucklin voting rules. ?The result was proved for the simplified Bucklin voting rule but the proof can
be modified easily for the Bucklin voting rule.
2 Preliminaries
Let us denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n} by [n] for any positive integer n. Let C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} be
a set of candidates or alternatives and V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} a set of voters. If not mentioned
otherwise, we denote the set of candidates by C, the set of voters by V, the number of
candidates by m, and the number of voters by n. Every voter vi has a preference or vote
i which is a complete order over C. We denote the set of complete orders over C by L(C).
We call a tuple of n preferences (1,2, · · · ,n) ∈ L(C)n an n-voter preference profile. It is
often convenient to view a preference as a subset of C × C — a preference  corresponds to
the subset A = {(x, y) ∈ C×C : x  y}. For a preference  and a subset A ⊆ C of candidates,
we define  (A) be the preference  restricted to A, that is  (A) = ∩(A × A). Let unionmulti
denote the disjoint union of sets. A map r : unionmultin,|C|∈N+L(C)n −→ 2C \ {∅} is called a voting
rule. For a voting rule r and a preference profile = (1, . . . ,n), we say a candidate x wins
uniquely if r() = {x} and x co-wins if x ∈ r(). For a vote ∈ L(C) and two candidates
x, y ∈ C, we say x is placed before y in  if x  y; otherwise we say x is placed after y in
. For any two candidates x, y ∈ C with x 6= y in an election E , let us define the margin
DE(x, y) of x from y to be |{i : x i y}| − |{i : y i x}|. Examples of some common voting
rules are as follows.
Positional scoring rules: A collection (−→sm)m∈N+ of m-dimensional vectors −→sm =
(αm, α2, . . . , α1) ∈ Nm with αm > α2 > . . . > α1 and αm > α1 for every m ∈ N+ naturally
defines a voting rule — a candidate gets score αi from a vote if it is placed at the ith position,
and the score of a candidate is the sum of the scores it receives from all the votes. The
winners are the candidates with maximum score. Scoring rules remain unchanged if we
multiply every αi by any constant λ > 0 and/or add any constant µ. Hence, we assume
without loss of generality that for any score vector −→sm, there exists a j such that αk = 0
for all k < j and the greatest common divisor of α1, . . . , αm is one. Such a −→sm is called a
normalized score vector. Without loss of generality, we will work with normalized scoring
rules only in this work. If αi is 1 for i ∈ [k] and 0 otherwise, then we get the k-approval
voting rule. For the k-veto voting rule, αi is 0 for i ∈ [m− k] and −1 otherwise. 1-approval
is called the plurality voting rule and 1-veto is called the veto voting rule.
Copelandα: Given α ∈ [0, 1], the Copelandα score of a candidate x is |{y 6= x :
DE(x, y) > 0}|+ α|{y 6= x : DE(x, y) = 0}|. The winners are the candidates with maximum
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Copelandα score. If not mentioned otherwise, we will assume α to be zero.
Maximin: The maximin score of a candidate x in an election E is miny 6=xDE(x, y). The
winners are the candidates with maximum maximin score.
Bucklin: Let ` be the minimum integer such that there exists at least one candidate
x ∈ C whom more than half of the voters place in their top ` positions. Then the Bucklin
winner is the candidate who is placed most number of times within top ` positions of the
votes.
Elections with Incomplete Information. A more general setting is an election where
the votes are only partial orders over candidates. A partial order is a relation that is reflexive,
antisymmetric, and transitive. A partial vote can be extended to possibly more than one
linear votes depending on how we fix the order for the unspecified pairs of candidates. Given
a partial vote , we say that an extension ′ of places the candidate c as high as possible
if a ′ c implies a ′′ c for every extension ′′ of .
I Definition 1. (r–Possible Winner)
Given a set of partial votes P over a set of candidates C and a candidate c ∈ C, does there
exist an extension P ′ of P such that c ∈ r(P ′)?
3 Results
For ease of exposition, we present all our results for the co-winner case. All our proofs extend
easily to the unique winner case too. We begin with our results for the scoring rules.
3.1 Scoring Rules
In this section, we establish a dichotomous result describing the status of the Possible
Winner problem for a large class of scoring rules when the number of undetermined pairs in
every vote is at most one, two, three, or four. We begin by introducing some terminology.
Instead of working directly with score vectors, it will sometimes be convenient for us to refer
to the “vector of differences”, which, for a score vector s with m coordinates, is a vector
d(s) with m− 1 coordinates with each entry being the difference between adjacent scores
corresponding to that location and the location left to it. This is formally stated below.
I Definition 2. Given a normalized score vector −→sm = (αm, αm−1, . . . , α1 = 0) ∈ Nm, the
associated difference vector d(−→sm) is given by (αm − αm−1, αm−1 − αm−2, . . . , α2 − α1) ∈
Nm−1. We also employ the following notation to refer to the smallest score difference among
all non-zero differences, and the largest score difference, respectively:
– δ(−→sm) = min({αi − αi−1 | 2 6 i 6 m and αi − αi−1 > 0})
– ∆(−→sm) = max({αi − αi−1 | 2 6 i 6 m})
Note that for every normalized score vector −→sm, ∆(−→sm) is always non-zero. We now
proceed to defining the notion of smooth scoring rules. Consider a score vector −→sm =
(αm, αm−1, . . . , α1). For 0 6 i 6 m, we say that −−−→sm+1 is obtained from sm by inserting α
just before position i from the right if:
−−−→sm+1 = (αm, αm−1, . . . , αi+1, α, αi, . . . , α2, α1) .
Note that if i = 0, we have −−−→sm+1 = (αm, αm−1, . . . , α1, α), and if i = m, then we have−−−→sm+1 = (α, αm, αm−1, . . . , α1). For 0 6 i 6 m, we say that the position i is admissible if
i = 0, or i = m, or αi+1 = αi.
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I Definition 3 (Smooth scoring rules). We say that a scoring rule s is smooth if there exists
some constant n0 ∈ N+ such that for all m > n0, the score vector −→sm can be obtained from−−−→sm−1 by inserting an additional score value at any position i that is admissible.
Intuitively speaking, a smooth scoring rule is one where the score vector for m candidates
can be obtained by either extending the one for (m− 1) candidates at one of the ends, or by
inserting a score between an adjacent pair of ambivalent locations (i.e, consecutive scores
in the score vector with the same value). Although at a first glance it may seem that the
class of smooth scoring rules involves an evolution from a limited set of operations, we note
that all of the common scoring rules, such as plurality, veto, k-approval, Borda, and scoring
rules of the form (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0), are smooth. We now turn to some definitions that will help
describe the cases that appear in our classification result.
I Definition 4. Let s = (−→sm)m∈N+ be a scoring rule.
– We say that s is a Borda-like scoring rule if there exists some n0 ∈ N+ for which we have
that ∆(−→sm) = δ(−→sm) for every m > n0.
– Any rule that is not Borda-like is called a differentiating scoring rule.
– For any vector t with ` co-ordinates, we say that s is t-difference-free if there exists some
n0 ∈ N+ such that for every m > n0, the vector t does not occur in d(−→sm). In other
words, the vector 〈d(−→sm)[i], . . . , d(−→sm)[i+ `− 1]〉 6= t for any 1 6 i 6 m− `.
– For any vector t, we say that s is t-contaminated it is not t-difference-free. We also say
that s is t-contaminated at m if the vector t occurs in d(−→sm).
We will frequently be dealing with Borda-like score vectors. To this end, the following
easy observation will be useful.
I Observation 1. If s = (−→sm)m∈N+ is a Borda-like scoring rule in its normalized form, then
there exists n0 ∈ N+ such that all the coordinates of d(−→sm) are either zero or one for all
m > n0.
It turns out that if a scoring rule is smooth, then its behavior with respect to some of the
properties above is fairly monotone. For instance, we have the following easy proposition. For
the interest of space, we move proofs of some of our results including all our polynomial time
algorithms to the appendix. For a few proofs, we only provide a sketch of the proof deferring
the complete proof to the appendix. We mark these results with ?. All our polynomial time
algorithms are based on reduction to the maximum flow problem in a graph.
I Proposition 1. [?] Let s = (−→sm)m∈N+ be a smooth scoring rule that is not Borda-like.
Then there exists some n0 ∈ N+ such that ∆(−→sm) 6= δ(−→sm) for every m > n0.
We are now ready to state the first classification result of this section, for the scenario
where every vote has at most one missing pair. We use (3, B2)–SAT to prove some of our
hardness results. The (3, B2)–SAT problem is the 3-SAT problem restricted to formulas
in which each clause contains exactly three literals, and each variable occurs exactly twice
positively and twice negatively. We know that (3, B2)–SAT is NP-complete [3]. Let us first
present a structural result for scoring rules which we will use subsequently.
Suppose we have a set C = {c1, . . . , cm−1, g} of m candidates including a “dummy”
candidate g. Then we know from [1, 11], that for a score vector (αm, . . . , α1) and integers
{kji }i∈[m−1],j∈[m−1], we can add votes polynomially many in
∑
i∈[m−1],j∈[m−1] k
j
i so that the
score of the candidate ci is λ+
∑
j∈[m−1] k
j
i (αj − αj+1) for some λ and the score of g is less
than λ. Since the greatest common divisor of non-zero differences of the consecutive entries
in a normalized score vector is one, we have the following.
CVIT 2016
23:6 On the Exact Amount of Missing Information that makes Finding Possible Winners Hard
I Lemma 5. Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} ∪D, (|D| > 0) be a set of candidates, and ~α a normalized
score vector of length |C|. Then for every X = (X1, . . . , Xm) ∈ Zm, there exists λ ∈ N and
a voting profile V such that the ~α-score of ci is λ+Xi for all 1 6 i 6 m, and the score of
candidates d ∈ D is less than λ. Moreover, the number of votes in V is O(poly(|C|·∑mi=1 |Xi|)).
I Theorem 6. [?] Let s be a smooth scoring rule. If s is differentiating, then the Possible
Winner problem is NP-complete, even if every vote has at most one undetermined pair of
candidates. Otherwise, the Possible Winner problem for s is in P if every vote has at
most one undetermined pair of candidates.
Proof. For the hardness result, we reduce from an instance of (3, B2)-SAT. Let I be an
instance of (3, B2)-SAT, over the variables V = {x1, . . . , xn} and with clauses T = {c1, . . . , ct}.
To construct the reduced instance I ′, we introduce two candidates for every variable, and
one candidate for every clause, one special candidate w, and a dummy candidate g to
achieve desirable score differences. Notationally, we will use bi (corresponding to xi) and b′i
(corresponding to x¯i) to refer to the candidates based on the variable xi and ej to refer to
the candidate based on the clause cj . To recap, the set of candidates are given by:
C = {bi, b′i | xi ∈ V} ∪ {ej | cj ∈ T } ∪ {w, g}.
Consider an arbitrary but fixed ordering over C, such as the lexicographic order. In
this proof, the notation
−→C′ for any C′ ⊆ C will be used to denote the lexicographic ordering
restricted to the subset C′. Let m denote |C| = 2n+ t+ 2, and let −→sm = (αm, αm−1, . . . , α1) ∈
Nm. Since s is a smooth differentiating scoring rule, we have that there exist 1 6 p, q 6 m
such that |p− q| > 1 and αp − αp−1 > αq − αq−1 > 1.
We use D to refer to the larger of the two differences above, namely αp − αp−1 and d to
refer to αq − αq−1. We now turn to a description of the votes. Fix an arbitrary subset C1
of (m− p) candidates. For every variable xi ∈ V, we introduce the following complete and
partial votes.
pi :=
−→C1  bi  b′i 
−−−→C \ C1 and p′i := pi \ {(bi, b′i)}
We next fix an arbitrary subset C2 ⊂ C of (m − q) candidates. Consider a literal `
corresponding to the variable xi. We use `? to refer to the candidate bj if the literal is
positive and b′j if the literal is negated. For every clause cj ∈ T given by cj = {`1, `2, `3}, we
introduce the following complete and partial votes.
qj,1 :=
−→C2  ej  `?1 
−−−→C \ C2 and q′j,1 := qj,1 \ {(ej , `?1)}
qj,2 :=
−→C2  ej  `?2 
−−−→C \ C2 and q′j,2 := qj,2 \ {(ej , `?2)}
qj,3 :=
−→C2  ej  `?3 
−−−→C \ C2 and q′j,3 := qj,3 \ {(ej , `?3)}
Let us define the following sets of votes:
P =
(
n⋃
i=1
pi
)
∪
 ⋃
16j6t,16b63
qj,b
 and P ′ = ( n⋃
i=1
p′i
)
∪
 ⋃
16j6t,16b63
q′j,b

There exists a set of complete votes W of size polynomial in m with the following
properties due to Theorem 5. Let s+ : C −→ N be a function mapping candidates to their
scores from the set of votes P ∪W. Then W can be constructed to ensure the scores as in
Table 2. We now define the instance I ′ of Possible Winner to be (C,P ′ ∪W, w). This
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s+(ej) = s+(w) + d ∀ 1 6 j 6 t s+(bi) = s+(w) + 1− d ∀ 1 6 i 6 n
s+(b′i) = s+(w) + 1− d−D ∀ 1 6 i 6 n s+(g) < s+(w)
Table 2 Score of candidates from P ∪W.
completes the description of the reduction. We now turn to a proof of the equivalence.
Before we begin making our arguments, observe that since w does not participate in any
undetermined pairs of the votes in P ′, it follows that the score of w continues to be s+(w) in
any completion of P ′. The intuition for the construction, described informally, is as follows.
The score of every “clause candidate” needs to decrease by d, which can be achieved by
pushing it down against its literal partner in the qj-votes. However, this comes at the cost of
increasing the score of the literals by 2d (since every literal appears in at most two clauses).
It turns out that this can be compensated appropriately by ensuring that the candidate
corresponding to the literal appears in the (p− 1)th position among the p-votes, which will
adjust for this increase. Therefore, the setting of the (b′i, bi) pairs in a successful completion
of pi can be read off as a signal for how the corresponding variable should be set by a
satisfying assignment. We defer the formal proof of equivalence of the two instances and the
polynomial time solvable case to the appendix. J
We make a couple of quick remarks before moving on to our next result. Observe that
any hardness result that holds for instances where every vote has at most k undetermined
pairs also holds for instances where every vote has at most k′ undetermined pairs with k′ > k,
by a standard special case argument. Therefore, the next question for us to address is that
of whether the Possible Winner problem is in P for all Borda-like scoring rules when the
number of undetermined pairs in every vote is at most two. We show that the complexity of
the Possible Winner problem for the Borda-like scoring rules crucially depends on the
presence (or absence) some particular patterns in the score vector. We begin with a hardness
result which uses a reduction from the Three Dimensional Matching problem. The
Three Dimensional Matching problem is known to be NP-complete and is defined as
follows.
I Definition 7 (Three Dimensional Matching). Given three disjoint sets X ,Y, and
Z of size t each and a collection S of subsets of X ∪ Y ∪ Z each containing exactly one
element from X , Y, and Z, does there exist a sub-collection S ′ ⊂ S of size t such that
∪A∈S′A = X ∪ Y ∪ Z.
To help us deal with the nature of the score vectors considered, we will use the following
proposition, which again reflects the monotonicity property alluded to earlier.
I Proposition 2. [?] Let s be a normalized smooth scoring rule that is not 〈1, 1〉-difference-
free. Then there exists some n0 ∈ N+ such that for every m > n0, s is 〈1, 1〉-contaminated
at m.
We are now ready to state our next result, which shows that if there are at most 2
undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote, and we are dealing with a smooth Borda-like
scoring rule s, then the Possible Winner problem is NP-complete if s is 〈1, 1〉-contaminated,
and solvable in polynomial time otherwise.
I Theorem 8. [?] Let s be a smooth, Borda-like scoring rule. If s is 〈1, 1〉-contaminated, the
Possible Winner problem is NP-complete, even if every vote has at most 2 undetermined
pairs of candidates. On the other hand, if s is 〈1, 1〉-difference-free, then the Possible
Winner problem for s is in P if every vote has at most 2 undetermined pairs of candidates.
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We now address the case involving at most 3 undetermined pairs in every vote. The
interesting scoring rules here are smooth Borda-like scoring rules that are 〈1, 1〉-difference-free.
It turns out that here, if the scoring rule is further 〈1, 0, 1〉-difference-free, then the problem
again admits a maxflow formulation. On the other hand, s is 〈1, 0, 1〉-contaminated at
m > N0 for osme constant N0, then the Possible Winner problem is NP-complete even
with 3 undetermined pairs of candidates per vote.
I Theorem 9. [?] Let s be a smooth, Borda-like, 〈1, 1〉-difference-free scoring rule. If there
exists a constant N0 ∈ N+ such that s is 〈1, 0, 1〉-contaminated for all m > n0, then the
Possible Winner problem is NP-complete, even if every vote has at most 3 undetermined
pairs. On the other hand, if s is 〈1, 0, 1〉-difference-free, then the Possible Winner problem
for s is in P if every vote has at most 3 undetermined pairs.
Remark. Note that unlike the previous two results, this statement is not a complete
classification, because we don’t have an appropriate analog of Propositions 1 and 2. Having
said that, our result holds for a more general class of scoring rules: those where s is 〈1, 0, 1〉-
contaminated at m “sufficiently” often, that is to say that if −→sm is 〈1, 0, 1〉-contaminated and
m′ > m is the smallest natural number for which −→sm is 〈1, 0, 1〉-contaminated, then m′ −m
is bounded by some polynomial function of m, by inserting appropriately many dummy
candidates using standard techniques.
We now turn to our final result for scoring rules. Let s be a smooth, Borda-like scoring
rule that is 〈1, 1〉-difference-free. Then we have the following. If s is 〈0, 1, 0〉-contaminated,
then the Possible Winner problem for s is NP-complete even when every vote has at
most 4 undetermined pairs of candidates. If s is 〈0, 1, 0〉-difference-free, then notice that
d(−→sm) for any suitably large m ∈ N+ can contain at most two ones (since s is also 〈1, 1〉-
difference-free). If the number of ones in d(−→sm) is one, then d(−→sm) either has a one on the
first or the last coordinate (recall that s is 〈0, 1, 0〉-difference-free), corresponding to the
plurality and veto voting rules, respectively. On the other hand, if the number of ones is two,
d(−→sm) = 〈1, 0, . . . , 0, 1〉, which is equivalent (in normal form) to the scoring rule (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0).
The Possible Winner problem is polynomial time solvable for plurality and veto voting
rules, and we show here that it is also polynomially solvable for the scoring rule (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0)
as long as the number of undetermined pairs of candidates in any vote is at most m − 1.
If we allow for m or more undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote, then we show
that the Possible Winner problem is NP-complete. As before, we will need the following
property of 〈1, 0, 1〉-contaminated vectors.
I Proposition 3. [?] Let s be a normalized smooth scoring rule that is not 〈1, 0, 1〉-difference-
free. Then there exists some n0 ∈ N+ such that s is 〈0, 1, 0〉-contaminated at m for every
m > n0.
We now state the final result in this section. It is easily checked that the result accounts
for all smooth, Borda-like scoring rules that are 〈1, 1〉-difference-free.
I Theorem 10. [?] Let s be a smooth, Borda-like scoring rule that is 〈1, 1〉-difference-free.
Then we have the following.
1. If s is 〈0, 1, 0〉-contaminated, then the Possible Winner problem for s is NP-complete
even when every vote has at most 4 undetermined pairs of candidates.
2. If s is equivalent to (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0), then Possible Winner is NP-complete even when
the number of undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote is at most m− 1.
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3. If s is equivalent to (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) and the number of undetermined pairs of candidates is
strictly less than m− 1, then Possible Winner is in P.
4. If s is neither 〈0, 1, 0〉-contaminated nor equivalent to (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0), then s is equivalent
to either the plurality or veto scoring rules and Possible Winner is in P for these cases.
3.2 Copelandα Voting Rule
We now turn to the Copelandα voting rule. We show in Theorem 11 below that the Possible
Winner problem is NP-complete for the Copelandα voting rule even when every vote has at
most 2 undetermined pairs of candidates for every α ∈ [0, 1].
I Theorem 11. [?] The Possible Winner problem is NP-complete for the Copelandα
voting rule even if the number of undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote is at most 2
for every α ∈ [0, 1].
We prove in Theorem 12 that the number of undetermined pairs of candidates in The-
orem 11 is tight for the Copeland0 and Copeland1 voting rules.
I Theorem 12. [?] The Possible Winner problem is in P for the Copeland0 and Copeland1
voting rules if the number of undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote is at most 1.
We show next that the Possible Winner problem is NP-complete for the Copelandα
voting rule even if the number of undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote is at most 1
for α ∈ (0, 1). We break the proof into two parts — Theorem 13 proves the result for every
α ∈ (0, 1/2] and Theorem 14 proves for every α ∈ [1/2, 1).
I Lemma 13. [?] The Possible Winner problem is NP-complete for the Copelandα voting
rule even if the number of undetermined pairs in every vote is at most 1 for every α ∈ (0, 1/2].
Proof. The Possible Winner problem for the Copelandα voting rule is clearly in NP. To
prove NP-hardness of Possible Winner, we reduce Possible Winner from (3, B2)–SAT.
Let I be an instance of (3, B2)–SAT, over the variables V = {x1, . . . , xn} and with clauses
T = {c1, . . . , cm}. We construct an instance I ′ of Possible Winner from I as follows.
Set of candidates: C = {xi, x¯i, di : i ∈ [n]}∪{ci : i ∈ [m]}∪{c}∪G, where G = {g1, . . . , gmn}
For every i ∈ [n], let us consider the following votes p1xi , p2xi , p1x¯i , p2x¯i .
p1xi , p
2
xi : xi  di  others , p1x¯i , p2x¯i : x¯i  di  others
Using p1xi , p
2
xi , p
1
x¯i , p
2
x¯i , we define the partial votes p
1′
xi , p
2′
xi , p
1′
x¯i , p
2′
x¯i as follows.
p1′xi , p
2′
xi : p
1
xi \ {(xi, di)} , p1′x¯i , p2′x¯i : p1x¯i \ {(x¯i, di)}
Let a clause cj involves the literals `1j , `2j , `3j . For every j ∈ [m], let us consider the
following votes qj(`1j ), qj(`2j ), qj(`3j ).
qj(`kj ) : cj  `kj  others,∀k ∈ [3]
Using qj(`1j ), qj(`2j ), qj(`3j ), we define the partial votes q′j(`1j ), q′j(`2j ), q′j(`3j ) as follows.
q′j(`kj ) : qj(`kj ) \ {(cj , `kj )},∀k ∈ [3]
Let us define
P = ∪i∈[n]{p1xi , p2xi , p1x¯i , p2x¯i} ∪j∈[m] {qj(`1j ), qj(`2j ), qj(`3j )}
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and
P ′ = ∪i∈[n]{p1′xi , p2′xi , p1′x¯i , p2′x¯i} ∪j∈[m] {q′j(`1j ), q′j(`2j ), q′j(`3j )}.
There exists a set of complete votes Q of size polynomial in n andm which realizes Table 3 [18].
All the wins and defeats in Table 3 are by a margin of 2. We now define the instance I ′ of
Possible Winner to be (C,P ′ ∪ Q, c). Notice that the number of undetermined pairs of
candidates in every vote in I ′ is at most 1. This finishes the description of the Possible
Winner instance. We defer the formal proof of equivalence of the two instances and the
polynomial time solvable case to the appendix. J
Candidates Copelandα score Winning against Losing against Tie with
c
(2n+m)α
+n+ 3mn/4 G
′ ⊂ G, |G′| = n+ 3mn/4 G \G
′, |G′| = n+ 3mn/4
di, ∀i ∈ [n]
xi, x¯i∀i ∈ [n]
cj∀j ∈ [m]
xi, ∀i ∈ [n] (2n+m)α+n+ 3mn/4
G′′ ⊂ G, |G′′| = 3mn/4
di∀i ∈ [n] G \ (G
′ ∪G′′)
c,G′ ⊂ G, |G′| = m
xj , ∀j ∈ [n] \ {i}
x¯j∀j ∈ [n]
x¯i, ∀i ∈ [n] (2n+m)α+n+ 3mn/4
G′′ ⊂ G, |G′′| = 3mn/4
di∀i ∈ [n] G \ (G
′ ∪G′′)
c,G′ ⊂ G, |G′| = m
x¯j , ∀j ∈ [n] \ {i}
xj∀j ∈ [n]
cj , ∀j ∈ [m] (2n+m− 1)α+n+ 3mn/4 + 1
xi, x¯i∀i ∈ [n]
G′ ⊂ G, |G′| = 3mn/4− n+ 1
G \ (G′ ∪G′′)
di, ∀i ∈ [n]
c
cj∀j ∈ [m] \ {i}
G′′ ⊂ G, |G′′| = 2n− 1
di, i ∈ [n] (2n+m)α+n+ 3mn/4− 1
c, cj , ∀j ∈ [m]
G′′ ⊂ G, |G′′| = 3mn/4−m+ n− 2
xi, x¯i∀i ∈ [n]
G \ (G′ ∪G′′) G
′ ⊂ G, |G′| = 2n+m
gi, ∀i ∈ [mn] < 3mn/4 ∀j ∈ {i+ k : k ∈ [b(mn−1)/2c]
Table 3 Summary of Copelandα scores of the candidates from P ∪Q. All the wins and defeats
in the table are by a margin of 2.
Next we present Theorem 14 which resolves the complexity of the Possible Winner
problem for the Copelandα voting rule for every α ∈ [1/2, 1) when every partial vote has at
most one undetermined pair of candidates.
I Lemma 14. [?] The Possible Winner problem is NP-complete for the Copelandα voting
rule even if the number of undetermined pairs in every vote is at most 1 for every α ∈ [1/2, 1).
We get the following result for the Copelandα voting rule from Theorem 13 and 14.
I Theorem 15. The Possible Winner problem is NP-complete for the Copelandα voting
rule even if the number of undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote is at most 1 for
every α ∈ (0, 1).
3.3 Maximin and Bucklin Voting Rules
To prove our hardness result for the maximin voting rule, we reduce the Possible Win-
ner problem from the d–Multicolored Independent Set problem which is defined as
below. d–Multicolored Independent Set is known to be NP-complete (for example,
see this [10]). We denote arbitrary instance of d–Multicolored Independent Set by(V = ∪ki=1Vk, E).
I Definition 16 (d–Multicolored Independent Set). Given a d-regular graph G =
(V, E), an integer k, and a partition of the set of vertices V into k independent sets V1, . . . ,Vk,
that is V = ∪i∈[k]Vi and Vi is an independent set for every i ∈ [k], does there exists an
independent set S ⊂ V in G such that |S ∩ Vi| = 1 for every i ∈ [k].
Now we prove our hardness result for the Possible Winner problem for the maximin
voting rule in Theorem 17.
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I Theorem 17. The Possible Winner problem is NP-complete for the maximin voting
rule even if the number of undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote is at most 2.
Proof. The Possible Winner problem for the maximin voting rule is clearly in NP. To prove
NP-hardness of Possible Winner, we reduce Possible Winner from d–Multicolored
Independent Set. Let I = (V = ∪ki=1Vk, E) be an arbitrary instance of d–Multicolored
Independent Set. We construct an instance I ′ of Possible Winner from I as follows.
Set of candidates: C = V ∪ E ∪ {c} ∪ {gi, g′i : i ∈ [k]}
For every u ∈ Vi and ` ∈ [d], let us consider the following vote pu.
p`u =
−−−−−−−−−−−→
(C \ {u, gi, g′i})u  gi  g′i  u,where
−−−−−−−−−−−→
(C \ {u, gi, g′i})u is any fixed ordering of C\{u, gi, g′i}
Using p`u, we define a partial vote p′`u as follows.
p′`u = p`u \ {(gi, u), (g′i, u)}
For every edge e = (ui, uj) where ui ∈ Vi and uj ∈ Vj , let us consider the following votes
pe,ui and pe,uj .
pe,ui =
−−−−−−−−−−→
(C \ {ui, g′i, e})  e  g′i  ui , pe,uj =
−−−−−−−−−−→
(C \ {uj , g′j , e})  e  g′j  uj
Using pe,ui and pe,uj , we define the partial votes p′e,ui and p
′
e,uj as follows.
p′e,ui = pe,ui \ {(e, ui), (g′i, ui)} , p′e,uj = pe,uj \ {(e, uj), (g′j , uj)}
Let us call pe = {pe,ui , pe,uj} and p′e = {p′e,ui , p′e,uj}. Let us define P = ∪u∈V,`∈[d]p`u∪e∈E
pe and P ′ = ∪u∈V,`∈[d]p′`u ∪e∈E p′e. There exists a set of complete votes Q of size polynomial
in |V| and |E| with the pairwise margins as in Table 4 [18]. Let λ > 3d be any positive even
integer.
∀e ∈ E ,DP∪Q(e, c) = λ ∀i ∈ [k], ∀u ∈ Vi,DP∪Q(u, gi) = λ− 2d
∀i ∈ [k], ∀u ∈ Vi,DP∪Q(g′i, u) = λ+ 2d ∀i ∈ [k], e ∈ E ,DP∪Q(e, g′i) = λ
∀e = (ui, uj) ∈ E ,DP∪Q(ui, e) = DP∪Q(uj , e) = λ− 2
Table 4 Pairwise margins of candidates from P ∪Q.
For every pair of candidates (ci, cj) ∈ C × C whose pairwise margin is not defined above,
we define DP∪Q(ci, cj) = 0. We summarize the maximin score of every candidate in P ∪Q
in Table 5. We now define the instance I ′ of Possible Winner to be (C,P ′ ∪Q, c). Notice
that the number of undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote in I ′ is at most 2. This
finishes the description of the Possible Winner instance. We claim that I and I ′ are
equivalent.
Candidates maximin score Worst against Candidates maximin score Worst against
c −λ e ∈ E (ui, uj) ∈ E −(λ− 2) ui, uj
u ∈ Vi −(λ+ 2d) g′i gi −(λ− 2d) u ∈ Vi
g′i −λ e ∈ E
Table 5 Summary of initial Copeland scores of the candidates
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In the forward direction, suppose that I be a Yes instance of d–Multicolored Inde-
pendent Set. Then there exists ui ∈ Vi for every i ∈ [k] such that U = {ui : i ∈ [k]} forms
an independent set. We extend the partial vote p′`u for every u ∈ Vi, i ∈ [k], ` ∈ [d] to p¯`u as
follows.
p¯`u =
{−−−−−−−−−−−→
(C \ {u, gi, g′i})u  u  gi  g′i u ∈ U−−−−−−−−−−−→
(C \ {u, gi, g′i})u  gi  g′i  u u /∈ U
For every e = (ui, uj), we extend p′e,ui and p
′
e,uj to p¯e,ui and p¯e,uj . Since U is an
independent set, at least one of ui and uj does not belong to U . Without loss of generality,
let us assume ui /∈ U .
p¯e,ui =
−−−−−−−−−−→
(C \ {ui, g′i, e})  ui  e  g′i , p¯e,uj =
−−−−−−−−−−→
(C \ {uj , g′j , e})  e  g′j  uj
Let us call p¯e = {p¯e,ui , p¯e,uj}. We consider the extension of P to P¯ = ∪u∈V,`∈[d]p¯`u∪e∈E p¯e.
We claim that c is a co-winner in the profile P¯ ∪ Q since the maximin score of c, gi, g′i for
every i ∈ [k], u ∈ V, and e ∈ E in P¯ ∪ Q is −λ.
In the reverse direction suppose the Possible Winner instance I ′ be a Yes instance.
Then there exists an extension of the set of partial votes P ′ to a set of complete votes P¯ such
that c is a co-winner in P¯ ∪ Q. Let us call the extension of p′`u in P¯ p¯`u, p′e,ui and p′e,uj in P¯
p¯e,ui and p¯e,uj respectively. First we notice that the maximin score of c in P¯ ∪Q is −λ since
the relative ordering of c with respect to every other candidate is already fixed in P ′ ∪ Q.
Now we observe that, in P ∪Q, the maximin score of gi for every i ∈ [k] is −(λ− 2d). Hence,
for c to co-win, there must exists at least one u∗i ∈ Vi for every i ∈ [k] such that u∗i  gi  g′i
in p¯`u∗
i
for every ` ∈ [d]. We claim that U = {u∗i : i ∈ [k]} is an independent set in I. If not,
then suppose there exists an edge e between u∗i and u∗j for some i, j ∈ [k]. Now notice that,
for c to co-win either u∗i  e  g′i in p¯e,u∗i or u∗j  e  g′j in p¯e,u∗j . However, this makes the
maximin score of either u∗i or u∗j strictly more than −λ contradicting our assumption that c
co-wins the election. Hence, U forms an independent set in I. J
We next prove in Theorem 18 that the maximum number of undetermined pairs of
candidates in Theorem 17 is tight.
I Theorem 18. [?] The Possible Winner problem is in P for the maximin voting rule if
the number of undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote is at most 1.
Finally, we state our results for the Bucklin voting rule.
I Theorem 19. [?] The Possible Winner problem is NP-complete for the Bucklin voting
rule even if the number of undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote is at most 2, and
is in P if the number of undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote is at most 1.
4 Conclusion
We have demonstrated the exact minimum number of undetermined pairs allowed per vote
which keeps the Possible Winner winner problem NP-complete, and we were able to
address a large class of scoring rules, Copelandα, maximin, and Bucklin voting rules. Our
results generalize many of the known hardness results in the literature, and show that for
many voting rules, we need a surprisingly small number of undetermined pairs (often just
one or two) for the Possible Winner problem to be NP-complete. In the context of scoring
rules, it would be interesting to extend these tight results to the class of pure scoring rules,
and to extend Theorem 9 to account for all smooth scoring rules.
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Appendix
I Proposition 1. [?] Let s = (−→sm)m∈N+ be a smooth scoring rule that is not Borda-like.
Then there exists some n0 ∈ N+ such that ∆(−→sm) 6= δ(−→sm) for every m > n0.
Proof. Since s is not Borda-like, there exists some ` ∈ N+ for which ∆(−→s` ) 6= δ(−→s` ). We
claim that for any m > `, ∆(−→sm) 6= δ(−→sm). We prove this by induction. The base case follows
directly from the assumption. Suppose the inductive hypothesis is that ∆(−→sm) 6= δ(−→sm),
for some m > `, where −→sm = (αm, αm−1, . . . , α1) ∈ Nm. Since ∆(−→sm) 6= δ(−→sm), there exists
1 6 j 6 m− 1 for which αj+1 − αj > 1 (since ∆(−→sm) > δ(−→sm) > 1), and in particular, this
implies that position j is not admissible.
Now using the fact that s is a smooth scoring rule, we let −−−→sm+1 be any score vector that
can be obtained from −→sm by inserting an additional score value at a position i, where we
recall that i must be an admissible position. Observe that i 6= j, so ∆(−−−→sm+1) > ∆(−→sm). Also
inserting a score value cannot increase the smallest non-zero score difference. Therefore,
δ(−→sm) > δ(−−−→sm+1) and the claim follows. J
I Theorem 6. [?] Let s be a smooth scoring rule. If s is differentiating, then the Possible
Winner problem is NP-complete, even if every vote has at most one undetermined pair of
candidates. Otherwise, the Possible Winner problem for s is in P if every vote has at
most one undetermined pair of candidates.
Proof. For the hardness result, we reduce from an instance of (3, B2)-SAT. Let I be
an instance of (3, B2)-SAT, over the variables V = {x1, . . . , xn} and with clauses T =
{c1, . . . , ct}.
To construct the reduced instance I ′, we introduce two candidates for every variable,
and one candidate for every clause, one special candidate w, and a dummy candidate g to
achieve desirable score differences. Notationally, we will use bi (corresponding to xi) and b′i
(corresponding to x¯i) to refer to the candidates based on the variable xi and ej to refer to
the candidate based on the clause cj . To recap, the set of candidates are given by:
C = {bi, b′i | xi ∈ V} ∪ {ej | cj ∈ T } ∪ {w, g}.
Consider an arbitrary but fixed ordering over C, such as the lexicographic order. In
this proof, the notation
−→C′ for any C′ ⊆ C will be used to denote the lexicographic ordering
restricted to the subset C′. Let m denote |C| = 2n+ t+ 2, and let −→sm = (αm, αm−1, . . . , α1) ∈
Nm. Since s is a smooth differentiating scoring rule, we have that there exist 1 6 p, q 6 m
such that |p− q| > 1 and the following holds:
αp − αp−1 > αq − αq−1 > 1
We use D to refer to the larger of the two differences above, namely αp − αp−1 and d to
refer to αq − αq−1. We now turn to a description of the votes. Fix an arbitrary subset C1
of (m− p) candidates. For every variable xi ∈ V, we introduce the following complete and
partial votes.
pi :=
−→C1  bi  b′i 
−−−→C \ C1 and p′i := pi \ {(bi, b′i)}
We next fix an arbitrary subset C2 ⊂ C of (m − q) candidates. Consider a literal `
corresponding to the variable xi. We use `? to refer to the candidate bj if the literal is
positive and b′j if the literal is negated. For every clause cj ∈ T given by cj = {`1, `2, `3}, we
introduce the following complete and partial votes.
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qj,1 :=
−→C2  ej  `?1 
−−−→C \ C2 and q′j,1 := qj,1 \ {(ej , `?1)}
qj,2 :=
−→C2  ej  `?2 
−−−→C \ C2 and q′j,2 := qj,2 \ {(ej , `?2)}
qj,3 :=
−→C2  ej  `?3 
−−−→C \ C2 and q′j,3 := qj,3 \ {(ej , `?3)}
Let us define the following sets of votes:
P =
(
n⋃
i=1
pi
)
∪
 ⋃
16j6t,16b63
qj,b

and
P ′ =
(
n⋃
i=1
p′i
)
∪
 ⋃
16j6t,16b63
q′j,b

There exists a set of complete votes W of size polynomial in m with the following
properties due to Theorem 5. Let s+ : C −→ N be a function mapping candidates to their
scores from the set of votes P ∪W . Then W can be constructed to ensure that the following
hold.
– s+(ej) = s+(w) + d for all 1 6 j 6 t.
– s+(bi) = s+(w) + 1− d for all 1 6 i 6 n.
– s+(b′i) = s+(w) + 1− d−D for all 1 6 i 6 n.
– s+(g) < s+(w)
We now define the instance I ′ of Possible Winner to be (C,P ′∪W, w). This completes
the description of the reduction. We now turn to a proof of the equivalence. Before we begin
making our arguments, observe that since w does not participate in any undetermined pairs
of the votes in P ′, it follows that the score of w continues to be s+(w) in any completion of
P ′. The intuition for the construction, described informally, is as follows. The score of every
“clause candidate” needs to decrease by d, which can be achieved by pushing it down against
its literal partner in the qj-votes. However, this comes at the cost of increasing the score
of the literals by 2d (since every literal appears in at most two clauses). It turns out that
this can be compensated appropriately by ensuring that the candidate corresponding to the
literal appears in the (p− 1)th position among the p-votes, which will adjust for this increase.
Therefore, the setting of the (b′i, bi) pairs in a successful completion of pi can be read off as a
signal for how the corresponding variable should be set by a satisfying assignment.
We now turn to a formal proof. In the forward direction, let τ : V → {0, 1} be a satisfying
assignment for I. Then we have the following completions of the votes in P ′. To begin with,
for all 1 6 i 6 n, we have:
p′′i :=
{ −→C1  b′i  bi  −−−→C \ C1 if τ(xi) = 1,−→C1  bi  b′i  −−−→C \ C1 if τ(xi) = 0.
For a clause cj = {`1, `2, `3}, suppose τ(`1) = 1. Then we have the following completions
for the votes qj,b, 1 6 b 6 3:
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q′′j,1 :=
−→C2  `?1  ej 
−−−→C \ C2,
q′′j,2 :=
−→C2  ej  `?2 
−−−→C \ C2,
q′′j,3 :=
−→C2  ej  `?3 
−−−→C \ C2
The completions for the cases when τ(`2) = 1 or τ(`3) = 1 are analogously defined. Now
consider the election given by the complete votes described above, which we denote by P ′′.
Let s? : C −→ N be the function that maps candidates to their scores from the votes P ′′ ∪W .
Then, we have the following.
– Since τ is a satisfying assignment, for every 1 6 j 6 t, we have that the candidate ej swaps
places with one of its companions in at least one of the votes qj,b, 1 6 b 6 3. Therefore,
it loses a score of at least d, leading to the observation that s′(ej) 6 s+(ej)− d = s+(w)
for all 1 6 j 6 t.
– We now turn to a candidate bi, for some 1 6 i 6 n. If τ(xi) = 0, then notice that the
score of bi does not change, and therefore s?(bi) = s+(bi) = s+(w)− d+ 1 6 s+(w), since
d > 1. Otherwise, note that it decreases by D and increases by at most 2d, implying that
s?(bi) = s+(bi) + 2d−D = s+(w) + 1−D + d 6 s+(w), as (D − d) > 1.
– Finally, consider the candidates b′i, for for some 1 6 i 6 n. If τ(xi) = 1, then notice that
the score of b′i increases by D, and therefore s?(b′i) = s+(b′i)+D = s+(w)−d+1 6 s+(w),
since d > 1. Otherwise, note that its score increases by at most 2d, implying that
s?(b′i) = s+(b′i) + 2d = s+(w) + 1−D + d 6 s+(w), as (D − d) > 1.
This completes the forward direction of the argument. In the other direction, let P ′′ be
any completion of the votes in P ′ which makes w a co-winner with respect to s. Let s? be
the function that computes the scores of all the candidates with respect to P ′′. We define
the following assignment to the variables of I based on P ′′:
τ(xi) :=
{
1 if −→C1  b′i  bi 
−−−→C \ C1 ∈ P ′′,
0 if −→C1  bi  b′i 
−−−→C \ C1 ∈ P ′′.
We claim that τ , as defined above, satisfies every clause in I. Consider any clause cj ∈ T .
Observe that the score of the corresponding candidate, ej , must decrease by at least d in
any valid completion, since s+(ej) = s+(w) + d. Therefore, for at least one of the votes qj,b,
1 6 b 6 3, we must have a completion where ej appears at position q − 1. We claim that the
literal ` that consequently appears at position q must be set to one by τ . Indeed, suppose
not. Then we have two cases, as follows:
– Suppose the literal ` corresponds to the positive appearance of a variable xj . If τ(xj) = 0,
then the score of bj has increased by d, making its final score equal to s+(w) + 1, which
is a contradiction.
– Suppose the literal ` corresponds to the negated appearance of a variable xj . If τ(xj) = 1,
then the score of bj has increased by D + d, making its final score equal to s+(w) + 1,
which is, again, a contradiction.
CVIT 2016
23:18 On the Exact Amount of Missing Information that makes Finding Possible Winners Hard
Now we turn to the proof of the polynomial time solvable case. Let the input instance
of Possible Winner be (C,P, c) where every partial vote in P has at most one pair of
candidates whose ordering is undetermined. In every partial vote in P we place the candidate
c as high as possible. Suppose in a partial vote p in P , one undetermined pair of candidates
appears at positions i and i+ 1 (from the bottom) and αi = αi+1. Then we fix the ordering
of the undetermined pair of candidates in p arbitrarily. Let us call the resulting profile P ′.
It is easy to see that (C,P, c) is a Yes instance if and only if (C,P ′, c) is a Yes instance.
Notice that the position of c in every vote in P ′ is fixed and thus we know the score of c; let
it be s(c). Also we can compute the minimum score that every candidate receives over all
extensions of P ′. Let s(w) be the minimum score of candidate w. If there exists a candidate
z such that s(z) > s(c), then we output No. Otherwise we construct the following flow graph
G = (V, E). For every partial vote v in P ′, we add a vertex vv in V . We also add a vertex vw
in V for every candidate w other than c. We also add two special vertices s and t in V. We
add an edge from s to vv for every v ∈ P ′ of capacity 1, an edge from vw to t of capacity
s(c)− s(w) for every candidate w other than c. If a vote v ∈ P ′ has an undetermined pair
(x, y) of candidates, we add an edge from vv to vx and vy each of capacity 1. Let the number
of votes in P ′ which are not complete be t. Now it is easy to see that the (C,P ′, c) is a Yes
instance if and only if there is a flow of size t in G. J
I Proposition 2. [?] Let s be a normalized smooth scoring rule that is not 〈1, 1〉-difference-
free. Then there exists some n0 ∈ N+ such that for every m > n0, s is 〈1, 1〉-contaminated
at m.
Proof. If s is not 〈1, 1〉-difference-free, then there exists some ` ∈ N+ for which s is 〈1, 1〉-
contaminated at `. In particular, this implies that there exists an index i for which αi+1−αi =
1 and αi −αi−1 = 1. We now argue that s is 〈1, 1〉-contaminated at m for every m > `. This
follows from the fact that the differences (αi+1 − αi) and (αi − αi−1) are “carried forward”.
In particular since the positions i− 1 and i are not admissible, it is not possible to diminish
these differences in any score vector s`+1 obtained from s`, and repeating this argument for
all m > ` gives us the desired claim. J
I Theorem 8. [?] Let s be a smooth, Borda-like scoring rule. If s is 〈1, 1〉-contaminated, the
Possible Winner problem is NP-complete, even if every vote has at most 2 undetermined
pairs of candidates. On the other hand, if s is 〈1, 1〉-difference-free, then the Possible
Winner problem for s is in P if every vote has at most 2 undetermined pairs of candidates.
Proof. Since the scoring rule is 〈1, 1〉-contaminated, for every ` > N0 for some constant
N0, there exists an index i ∈ [` − 2] in the score vector (αj)j∈[`] such that αi+2 − αi+1 =
αi+1 − αi = 1. We begin with the proof of hardness. The Possible Winner problem is
clearly in NP. To prove NP-hardness of Possible Winner, we reduce Possible Winner
from Three Dimensional Matching. Let I = (X ∪ Y ∪ Z,S) be an arbitrary instance
of Three Dimensional Matching. Let |X | = |Y| = |Z| = m > N0. We construct an
instance I ′ of Possible Winner from I as follows.
C = X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ {c, d}
For every s = (x, y, z) ∈ S, let us consider the following vote ps.
ps =
−−−−−→
(C \ Cs)  x  y  z  −→Cs, for some fixed Cs ⊂ (C \ {x, y, z}) with |Cs| = i− 1
Using ps, we define a partial vote p′s as follows.
p′s = ps \ {(x, y), (x, z)}
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Let us define P = ∪s∈Sps and P ′ = ∪s∈Sp′s. There exists a set of complete votes Q of
size polynomial in m with the scores as in Table 6 due to Theorem 5. Let sP∪Q : C −→ N be
a function mapping candidates to their scores from the set of votes P ∪Q.
sP∪Q(x) = sP∪Q(c) + 2, ∀x ∈ X sP∪Q(y) = sP∪Q(c)− 1, ∀y ∈ Y
sP∪Q(z) = sP∪Q(c)− 1, ∀z ∈ Z sP∪Q(d) < sP∪Q(c)
Table 6 Score of candidates from P ∪W.
We now define the instance I ′ of Possible Winner to be (C,P ′ ∪Q, c). Notice that the
number of undetermined pairs in every vote in I ′ is at most 2. This finishes the description
of the Possible Winner instance. We claim that I and I ′ are equivalent.
In the forward direction, suppose that I be a Yes instance of Three Dimensional
Matching. Then, there exists a collection of m sets S ′ ⊂ S in S such that ∪A∈S′A =
X ∪ Y ∪ Z. We extend the partial vote p′s to p¯s as follows for s ∈ S.
p¯s =
{−−−−−→
(C \ Cs)  y  z  x  −→Cs s ∈ S ′−−−−−→
(C \ Cs)  x  y  z  −→Cs s /∈ S ′
We consider the extension of P to P¯ = ∪s∈S p¯s. We claim that c is a co-winner in the
profile P¯ ∪ Q since sP¯∪Q(c) = sP¯∪Q(x) = sP¯∪Q(y) = sP¯∪Q(z) > sP¯∪Q(d).
For the reverse direction, suppose the Possible Winner instance I ′ be a Yes instance.
Then there exists an extension of the set of partial votes P ′ to a set of complete votes P¯ such
that, c is a co-winner in P¯ ∪ Q. Let us call the extension of p′s in P¯ p¯s. We first claim that,
for every x ∈ X , there exists exactly one s ∈ S such that p¯s =
−−−−−→
(C \ Cs)  y  z  x  −→Cs.
Notice that, the score of c is same in every extension of P ′. Hence, for c to co-win, every
candidate x ∈ X must lose αi+2 −αi points. If there are more than one vote in P¯ where x is
placed after some candidate y ∈ Y, then the total increase of scores of all the candidates
in Y is more than m(αi+2 − αi+1) and thus there exists a candidate y′ ∈ Y whose score
has increased by strictly more than αi+2 − αi+1. However, in such a scenario, the score of
y′ will be strictly more than the score of c contradicting the fact that c is a co-winner in
P¯ ∪ Q. Now, the claim follows from the observation that, every x ∈ X must lose αi+2 − αi
scores in order to c co-win. Let S ′ ⊆ S be the collections of sets s ∈ S such that x ∈ s
is placed after z ∈ s in p¯s. From the claim above, we have |S ′| = m. We now claim that,
∪s ∈ S ′ = X ∪ Y ∪ Z. Indeed, otherwise there exists a candidate a ∈ Y ∪ Z who does not
belong to ∪s ∈ S ′. But then the score of a is strictly more than the score of c contradicting
the fact that c is a co-winner in P¯ ∪ Q. Hence, I ′ is also a Yes instance
The proof for the polynomial time solvable case is similar to the polynomial time solvable
case in Theorem 6. J
I Theorem 9. [?] Let s be a smooth, Borda-like, 〈1, 1〉-difference-free scoring rule. If there
exists a constant N0 ∈ N+ such that s is 〈1, 0, 1〉-contaminated for all m > n0, then the
Possible Winner problem is NP-complete, even if every vote has at most 3 undetermined
pairs. On the other hand, if s is 〈1, 0, 1〉-difference-free, then the Possible Winner problem
for s is in P if every vote has at most 3 undetermined pairs.
Proof. For every ` > N0, there exists an index i ∈ [`− 2] in the score vector (αj)j∈[`] such
that αi+3 − αi+2 = αi+1 − αi = 1 and αi+2 = αi+1. Let αi = α. We begin with the proof
of hardness. The Possible Winner problem is clearly in NP. To prove NP-hardness of
Possible Winner, we reduce Possible Winner from Three Dimensional Matching.
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Let I = (X ∪ Y ∪ Z,S) be an arbitrary instance of Three Dimensional Matching. Let
|X | = |Y| = |Z| = m > N0. We construct an instance I ′ of Possible Winner from I as
follows.
Set of candidates: C = X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ {c, d}
For every s = (x, y, z) ∈ S, let us consider the following vote ps.
ps =
−−−−−→
(C \ Cs)  x  y  d  z  −→Cs, for some fixed Cs ⊂ (C \ {x, y, z}) with |Cs| = i− 1
Using ps, we define a partial vote p′s as follows.
p′s = ps \ {(x, y), (x, d), (x, z)}
Let us define P = ∪s∈Sps and P ′ = ∪s∈Sp′s. There exists a set of complete votes Q of
size polynomial in m with the following properties due to Theorem 5. Let sP∪Q : C −→ N
be a function mapping candidates to their scores from the set of votes P ∪Q.
– sP∪Q(x) = sP∪Q(c) + 2, ∀x ∈ X
– sP∪Q(y) = sP∪Q(c)− 1,∀y ∈ Y
– sP∪Q(z) = sP∪Q(c)− 1,∀z ∈ Z
– sP∪Q(d) < sP∪Q(c)
We now define the instance I ′ of Possible Winner to be (C,P ′ ∪Q, c). Notice that the
number of undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote in I ′ is at most 3. This finishes
the description of the Possible Winner instance. We claim that I and I ′ are equivalent.
In the forward direction, suppose that I be a Yes instance of Three Dimensional
Matching. Then there exists a collection ofm sets S ′ ⊂ S in S such that ∪A∈S′A = X∪Y∪Z.
We extend the partial vote p′s to p¯s as follows for s ∈ S.
p¯s =
{−−−−−→
(C \ Cs)  y  d  z  x  −→Cs s ∈ S ′−−−−−→
(C \ Cs)  x  y  d  z  −→Cs s /∈ S ′
We consider the extension of P to P¯ = ∪s∈S p¯s. We claim that c is a co-winner in the
profile P¯ ∪ Q since sP¯∪Q(c) = sP¯∪Q(x) = sP¯∪Q(y) = sP¯∪Q(z) > sP¯∪Q(d).
For the reverse direction, suppose the Possible Winner instance I ′ be a Yes instance.
Then there exists an extension of the set of partial votes P ′ to a set of complete votes P¯ such
that c is a co-winner in P¯ ∪ Q. Let us call the extension of p′s in P¯ p¯s. We first claim that,
for every x ∈ X , there exists exactly one s ∈ S such that p¯s =
−−−−−→
(C \ Cs)  y  d  z  x  −→Cs.
Notice that, the score of c is same in every extension of P ′. Hence, for c to co-win, every
candidate x ∈ X must lose 2 points. If there are more than one vote in P¯ where x is placed
after some candidate y ∈ Y, then the total increase of scores of all the candidates in Y is
more than m and thus there exists a candidate y′ ∈ Y whose score has increased by strictly
more than 2. However, in such a scenario, the score of y′ will be strictly more than the score
of c contradicting the fact that c is a co-winner in P¯ ∪ Q. Now the claim follows from the
observation that, every x ∈ X must lose 2 scores in order to c co-win. Let S ′ ⊆ S be the
collections of sets s ∈ S such that x ∈ s is placed after z ∈ s in p¯s. From the claim above, we
have |S ′| = m. We now claim that, ∪s ∈ S ′ = X ∪ Y ∪ Z. Indeed, otherwise there exists
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a candidate a ∈ Y ∪ Z who does not belong to ∪s ∈ S ′. But then the score of a is strictly
more than the score of c contradicting the fact that c is a co-winner in P¯ ∪ Q. Hence, I ′ is
also a Yes instance.
We now turn to the polynomial time solvable case. Let the input instance of Possible
Winner be (C,P, c) where every partial vote in P has at most 3 pairs of candidates whose
ordering is undetermined. In every partial vote in P we place the candidate c as high as
possible. Suppose in a partial vote p in P, one undetermined pair of candidates appears
at positions i and i+ 1 (from the bottom) and αi = αi+1. Then we fix the ordering of the
undetermined pair of candidates in p arbitrarily. Let us call the resulting profile P ′. It is easy
to see that (C,P, c) is a Yes instance if and only if (C,P ′, c) is a Yes instance. Notice that
the position of c in every vote in P ′ is fixed and thus we know the score of c; let it be s(c).
Also we can compute the minimum score that every candidate receives over all extensions of
P ′. Let s(w) be the minimum score of candidate w. If there exists a candidate z such that
s(z) > s(c), then we output No. Otherwise we construct the following flow graph G = (V, E).
For every partial vote v in P ′, we add a vertex vv in V. We also add a vertex vw in V for
every candidate w other than c. We also add two special vertices s and t in V. We add an
edge from vw to t of capacity s(c) − s(w) for every candidate w other than c. Consider a
partial v ∈ P ′ where the three undetermined pairs of candidates be (x1, x2), (y1, y2), (z1, z2).
We add edges from vv to vw for candidate w other than c as follows.
– If the sets {x1, x2}, {y1, y2}, and {z1, z2} are mutually disjoint, then we add three vertices
vv(x1, x2), vv(y1, y2), and vv(z1, z2), add edges from vv to each of them each of capacity
1, add edges from vv(x1, x2) to vx1 and vx2 , edges from vv(y1, y2) to vy1 and vy2 , edges
from vv(z1, z2) to vz1 and vz2 each with capacity 1 and an edge from s to vv for every
v ∈ P ′ of capacity 3.
– If {x1, x2} and {y1, y2} are each disjoint with {z1, z2} and {x1, x2} ∩ {y1, y2} = {x1} =
{y1}, then, without loss of generality, let us assume x2 > y2 in v. Now observe that since
the scoring rule is 〈1, 0, 1〉-difference-free, exactly one of x2 and y2 gets a score of one in
every extension of v; say x2 gets a score of one in every extension of v. Also observe that
exactly one of x1 and y2 gets a score of 1 in any extension of v. Hence, we add an edge
from vv to x1 and another edge from vv to y2 each with capacity 1.
– If |{x1, x2} ∪ {y1, y2} ∪ {z1, z2}| = 3 (say {x1, x2} ∪ {y1, y2} ∪ {z1, z2} = {a1, a2, a3}),
then either exactly one of ai, i ∈ [3] gets a score of 1 in every extension of v or exactly
two of ai, i ∈ [3] gets a score of 1 in every extension of v. We add an edge from s to vv
for every v ∈ P ′ of capacity 1 in the former case and of capacity 2 in the later case.
Now it is easy to see that the (C,P ′, c) is a Yes instance if and only if there is a flow of size
t in G. J
I Proposition 3. [?] Let s be a normalized smooth scoring rule that is not 〈1, 0, 1〉-
difference-free. Then there exists some n0 ∈ N+ such that s is 〈0, 1, 0〉-contaminated at m
for every m > n0.
Proof. If s is not 〈0, 1, 0〉-difference-free, then there exists some ` ∈ N+ for which s is
〈0, 1, 0〉-contaminated at `. In particular, this implies that the score vector admits the
pattern (α, α, α + 1, α + 1). Let the positions (counted from the bottom) for these scores
be i, i− 1, i− 2 and i− 3, respectively. Now note that i− 2 is not an admissible position,
and it follows that any score vector s`+1 obtained from s` will therefore continue to be
〈0, 1, 0〉-contaminated. Repeating this argument for all m > ` gives us the desired claim. J
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I Theorem 10. [?] Let s be a smooth, Borda-like scoring rule that is 〈1, 1〉-difference-free.
Then we have the following.
1. If s is 〈0, 1, 0〉-contaminated, then the Possible Winner problem for s is NP-complete
even when every vote has at most 4 undetermined pairs of candidates.
2. If s is equivalent to (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0), then Possible Winner is NP-complete even when
the number of undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote is at most m− 1.
3. If s is equivalent to (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) and the number of undetermined pairs of candidates is
strictly less than m− 1, then Possible Winner is in P.
4. If s is neither 〈0, 1, 0〉-contaminated nor equivalent to (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0), then s is equivalent
to either the plurality or veto scoring rules and Possible Winner is in P for these cases.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is described in four parts corresponding to the four
statements above.
Proof of Part 1. A careful reading of the proof of Theorem 2 in [23] reveals that
the Possible Winner winner problem is NP-complete even when every vote has at most
4 undetermined pairs for any scoring rule for which there exists an index i such that
αi+3 = αi+2 = αi+1 + 1 = αi + 1. Hence, our result follows immediately.
Proof of Part 2. The reduction is similar in spirit to the construction used in the proof
of Theorem 6. We describe it in detail for the sake of completeness. As before, we reduce
from an instance of (3, B2)-SAT. Let I be an instance of (3, B2)-SAT, over the variables
V = {x1, . . . , xn} and with clauses T = {c1, . . . , ct}.
To construct the reduced instance I ′, we introduce four candidates for every variable,
and one candidate for every clause, one special candidate w, and a dummy candidate g to
achieve desirable score differences. Notationally, we will use wi, di, bi and b′i to refer to the
candidates based on the variable xi and ej to refer to the candidate based on the clause cj .
Among these candidates, the wi’s and di’s are “dummy” candidates, while the bi’s correspond
to xi and b′i corresponds to xi. To recap, the set of candidates are given by:
C = {wi, di, bi, b′i | xi ∈ V} ∪ {ej | cj ∈ T } ∪ {w, g}.
Consider an arbitrary but fixed ordering over C, such as the lexicographic order. In
this proof, the notation
−→C′ for any C′ ⊆ C will be used to denote the lexicographic ordering
restricted to the subset C′. Let m denote |C| = 3n+ t+ 2, and let −→sm = (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) ∈ Nm.
For every variable xi ∈ V, we introduce the following complete and partial votes.
ai := wi 
−−−−−−−−−−→C \ {wi, bi, di}  di  bi and a′i := ai \ {(bi, c) | for all c ∈ C \ {bi}}
bi := wi 
−−−−−−−−−−→C \ {wi, b′i, di}  di  b′i and b′i := bi \ {(b′i, c) | for all c ∈ C \ {b′i}}
We use `? to refer to the candidate bj if the literal is positive and b′j if the literal is negated.
For every clause cj ∈ T given by cj = {`1, `2, `3}, we introduce the following complete and
partial votes.
qj,1 :=
−−−−−−−→C \ {ej , `?1}  ej  `?1 and q′j,1 := qj,1 \ {(ej , `?1)}
qj,2 :=
−−−−−−−→C \ {ej , `?2}  ej  `?2 and q′j,2 := qj,2 \ {(ej , `?2)}
N. Misra and P. Dey 23:23
qj,3 :=
−−−−−−−→C \ {ej , `?3}  ej  `?3 and q′j,3 := qj,3 \ {(ej , `?3)}
Let us define the following sets of votes:
P =
(
n⋃
i=1
ai
)
∪
(
n⋃
i=1
bi
)
∪
 ⋃
16j6t,16b63
qj,b

and
P ′ =
(
n⋃
i=1
a′i
)
∪
(
n⋃
i=1
b′i
)
∪
 ⋃
16j6t,16b63
q′j,b

There exists a set of complete votes W of size polynomial in m with the following
properties due to Theorem 5. Let s+ : C −→ N be a function mapping candidates to their
scores from the set of votes P ∪W . Then W can be constructed to ensure that the following
hold.
– s+(wi) = s+(w) + 1 for all 1 6 i 6 n.
– s+(ej) = s+(w) + 1 for all 1 6 j 6 t.
– s+(bi) = s+(w)− 2 for all 1 6 i 6 n.
– s+(b′i) = s+(w)− 2 for all 1 6 i 6 n.
– s+(g) < s+(w) and s+(di) < s+(w) for all 1 6 i 6 n.
We now define the instance I ′ of Possible Winner to be (C,P ′∪W, w). This completes
the description of the reduction. Observe that all the partial votes either have at most m− 1
undetermined pairs, as required. We now turn to a proof of the equivalence. Before we begin
making our arguments, observe that since w does not participate in any undetermined pairs
of the votes in P ′, it follows that the score of w continues to be s+(w) in any completion of
P ′. The intuition for the construction, described informally, is as follows. The score of every
“clause candidate” needs to decrease by at least one, which can be achieved by pushing it
down against its literal partner in the qj-votes. Also, the score of every wi must also decrease
by at least one, and the only way to achieve this is to push either bi or b′i to the top in the
two votes corresponding to the variable xi. This causes the candidate bi (or b′i, as the case
may be) to gain a score of two, leading to a tie with w, and rendering it impossible for us to
use it to “fix” the situation for a clause candidate. Therefore, in any successful completion,
whether bi or b′i retains the zero-position works as a signal for how the corresponding variable
should be set by a satisfying assignment.
We now turn to a formal proof. In the forward direction, let τ : V → {0, 1} be a satisfying
assignment for I. Then we have the following completions of the votes in P ′. To begin with,
for all 1 6 i 6 n, we have:
a′′i :=
{
wi 
−−−−−−−−−−→C \ {wi, bi, di}  di  bi if τ(xi) = 1,
bi 
−−−−−−−−−−→C \ {wi, bi, di}  di  wi if τ(xi) = 0.
and also:
b′′i :=
{
wi 
−−−−−−−−−−→C \ {wi, b′i, di}  di  b′i if τ(xi) = 0,
b′i 
−−−−−−−−−−→C \ {wi, b′i, di}  di  wi if τ(xi) = 1.
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For a clause cj = {`1, `2, `3}, suppose τ(`1) = 1. Then we have the following completions
for the votes qj,b, 1 6 b 6 3:
q′′j,1 :=
−−−−−−−→C \ {ej , `?1}  `?1  ej ,
q′′j,2 :=
−−−−−−−→C \ {ej , `?2}  ej  `?2,
q′′j,3 :=
−−−−−−−→C \ {ej , `?3}  ej  `?3
The completions for the cases when τ(`2) = 1 or τ(`3) = 1 are analogously defined. It is
easily checked that w is a co-winner in this completion, because the score of every bi and b′i
increases by at most two (given that we based the extensions on a satisfying assignment),
and the scores of the wi’s and the ej ’s decrease by one, as required.
This completes the forward direction of the argument. In the other direction, let P ′′ be
any completion of the votes in P ′ which makes w a co-winner with respect to s. Let s? be
the function that computes the scores of all the candidates with respect to P ′′. We define
the following assignment to the variables of I based on P ′′:
τ(xi) :=
{
1 if wi 
−−−−−−−−−−→C \ {wi, bi, di}  di  bi ∈ P ′′,
0 if wi 
−−−−−−−−−−→C \ {wi, bi, di}  di  b′i ∈ P ′′.
We claim that τ , as defined above, satisfies every clause in I. Consider any clause cj ∈ T .
Observe that the score of the corresponding candidate, ej , must decrease by at least one in
any valid completion, since s+(ej) = s+(w) + 1. notice that any completion of the votes
corresponding to the variables xi cannot influence the score of ej , because the only candidates
that change scores in any completion are bi, b′i, wi and di. Therefore, in at least one of the
votes qj,b, 1 6 b 6 3, we must have a completion where ej appears at the last position. We
claim that the literal ` that consequently appears at position q must be set to one by τ .
Indeed, suppose not. Then we have two cases, as follows:
– Suppose the literal ` corresponds to the positive appearance of a variable xj . If τ(xj) = 0,
then this implies that bi 
−−−−−−−−−−→C \ {wi, bi, di}  di  wi ∈ P ′′ (if not, then the score of wi
remains unchanged, a contradiction). However, this implies that bi has gained a score of
three altogether, which is also a contradiction.
– Suppose the literal ` corresponds to the negated appearance of a variable xj . If τ(xj) = 1,
then this implies that b′i 
−−−−−−−−−−→C \ {wi, bi, di}  di  wi ∈ P ′′ (if not, then the score of wi
remains unchanged, a contradiction). However, this implies that b′i has gained a score of
three altogether, which is also a contradiction.
Proof of Part 3. Now we turn to the proof of the polynomial time solvable case. Let
the input instance of Possible Winner be (C,P, c) where every partial vote in P has at
most m− 2 pairs of candidates whose ordering is undetermined. For any p ∈ P , let A(p) ⊆ C
denote the set of candidates x for which (y  x) /∈ p for any y ∈ C. Note that in any valid
extension of p, the candidate who occupies the first position (thereby getting a score of two)
belongs to A(p). Similarly, let B(p) ⊆ C denote the set of candidates x for which (x  y) /∈ p
for any y ∈ C. Note that in any valid extension of p, the candidate who occupies the last
position (thereby getting a score of zero) belongs to B(p). Also, since there are at most
m− 2 missing pairs, note that A(p) ∩B(p) = ∅.
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In every partial vote in P we place the candidate c as high as possible. Suppose in a
partial vote p in P, one undetermined pair of candidates appears at positions i and i + 1
(from the bottom), where i+ 1 is not the top position and i is not the bottom position. Then
we fix the ordering of the undetermined pair of candidates in p arbitrarily. Let us call the
resulting profile P ′. It is easy to see that (C,P, c) is a Yes instance if and only if (C,P ′, c) is
a Yes instance. Notice that the position of c in every vote in P ′ is fixed and thus we know
the score of c; let it be s(c). Also we can compute the minimum score that every candidate
receives over all extensions of P ′. Let s(w) be the minimum score of candidate w. If there
exists a candidate z such that s(z) > s(c), then we output No.
Otherwise, we construct the following flow graph G = (V, E). For every partial vote p in
P ′, we add two vertices ap and bp in V . We also add a vertex vw in V for every candidate w
other than c. We also add two special vertices s and t in V. We add an edge from s to ap
for every p ∈ P ′ for which A(p) is non-empty, and the capacity of this edge is 1. We also
add an edge from s to bp for all p ∈ P ′ for which B(p) is non-empty, and the capacity of
these edges is equal to |B(p)| − 1. For every vote p, we add an edge from the vertex ap to all
vertices in A(vp), and an edge from the vertex bp to all vertices in B(vp). All these edges
have a capacity of one. Finally, we an edge from vw to t of capacity s(c)− s(w) for every
candidate w other than c.
Let the number of votes in P ′ which are not complete be t. Now it is easy to see that the
(C,P ′, c) is a Yes instance if and only if there is a flow of size t+∑p∈V′(|B(p)| − 1) in G,
where V ′ denotes the subset of votes who admit a non-empty B-set.
Proof of Part 4. Observe that if the difference vector has at least three 1s, then the
scoring rule is always either 〈1, 1〉-contaminated or 〈0, 1, 0〉-contaminated. If the difference
vector has at least two 1s, then the scoring rule is either 〈0, 1, 0〉-contaminated or it is
equivalent to (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0). If the scoring rule has one 1, then it is either plurality or veto or
k-approval for some 1 < k < m− 1. Now the results follows from the fact that the k-approval
voting rule is 〈0, 1, 0〉-contaminated for every 1 < k < m− 1. J
I Theorem 11. [?] The Possible Winner problem is NP-complete for the Copelandα
voting rule even if the number of undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote is at most 2
for every α ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. The Possible Winner problem for the Copelandα voting rule is clearly in NP.
To prove NP-hardness of Possible Winner, we reduce Possible Winner from Three
Dimensional Matching. Let I = (X ∪ Y ∪ Z,S) be an arbitrary instance of Three
Dimensional Matching. Let |X | = |Y| = |Z| = m. We construct an instance I ′ of
Possible Winner from I as follows.
Set of candidates: C = X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ {c} ∪ G, where G = {g1, . . . , g10m}
For every s = (x, y, z) ∈ S, let us consider the following vote ps.
ps =
−−−−−−−−−−→
(C \ {x, y, z})s  x  y  z,where
−−−−−−−−−−→
(C \ {x, y, z})s is any fixed ordering of C \{x, y, z}
Using ps, we define a partial vote p′s as follows.
p′s = ps \ {(x, y), (x, z)}
Let us define P = ∪s∈Sps and P ′ = ∪s∈Sp′s. There exists a set of complete votes Q of
size polynomial in m with the following properties [18].
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– DP∪Q(x, y) = DP∪Q(x, z) = 1,∀x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z
– DP∪Q(x, gi) = 1,DP∪Q(gj , x) = 1,∀x ∈ X , i ∈ [8m+ 1], j ∈ [10m] \ [8m+ 1]
– DP∪Q(y, gi) = DP∪Q(gj , y) = DP∪Q(z, gi) = DP∪Q(gj , z) = 1,∀y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z, i ∈
[10m− 2], j ∈ {10m− 1, 10m}
– DP∪Q(x, c) = DP∪Q(y, c) = DP∪Q(z, c) = DP∪Q(c, g) = 1,∀x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z, g ∈ G
– DP∪Q(gj , gi) = 1,∀i ∈ [5m], j ∈ {i+ 1, i+ 2, . . . , i+ b(10m−1)/2c}
All the pairwise margins which are not specified above is any integer in {−1, 1}. We
summarize the Copeland score of every candidate in C from P ∪ Q in Table 7. We now
define the instance I ′ of Possible Winner to be (C,P ′ ∪Q, c). Notice that the number of
undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote in I ′ is at most 2. This finishes the description
of the Possible Winner instance I ′. Notice that since the number of voters in I ′ is odd
(since the pairwise margins are odd integers), the actual value of α does not play any role
since no two candidates tie. Hence, in the rest of the proof, we omit α while mentioning the
voting rule. We claim that I and I ′ are equivalent.
Candidates Copeland score Winning against
c 10m G
x ∈ X 10m+ 2 c, Y, Z, {gi : i ∈ [8m+ 1]}
y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z 10m− 1 c, {gi : i ∈ [10m− 2]}
gi ∈ G < 9m ⊆ C \ {gj : j ∈ {i+ 1, i+ 2, . . . , i+ b10m−1)/2c}}
Table 7 Summary of initial Copeland scores of the candidates
In the forward direction, suppose that I be a Yes instance of Three Dimensional
Matching. Then there exists a collection ofm sets S ′ ⊂ S in S such that ∪A∈S′A = X∪Y∪Z.
We extend the partial vote p′s to complete vote p¯s as follows for every s ∈ S.
p¯s =
{−−−−−−−−−−→
(C \ {x, y, z})s  y  z  x s ∈ S ′−−−−−−−−−−→
(C \ {x, y, z})s  x  y  z s /∈ S ′
We consider the extension of P ′ to P¯ = ∪s∈S p¯s. We observe that c is a co-winner in the
profile P¯ ∪ Q since the Copeland score of c, every x ∈ X , y ∈ Y , and z ∈ Z in P¯ ∪ Q is 10m
and the Copeland score of every candidate in G in P¯ ∪ Q is strictly less than 9m.
In the reverse direction we suppose that the Possible Winner instance I ′ be a Yes
instance. Then there exists an extension of the set of partial votes P ′ to a set of complete
votes P¯ such that c is a co-winner in P¯ ∪ Q. Let us call the extension of the partial vote
p′s in P¯ p¯s. First we notice that the Copeland score of c in P¯ ∪ Q is 10m since the relative
ordering of c with respect to every other candidate is already fixed in P ′∪Q. Now we observe
that, in P ∪ Q, the Copeland score of every candidate in X is 2 more than the Copeland
score of c, whereas the Copeland score of every candidate in Y and Z is 1 less than the
Copeland score of c. Hence, the only way for c to co-win the election is as follows: every
candidate in X loses against exactly one candidate in Y and exactly one candidate in Z.
This in turn is possible only if, for every x ∈ X , there exists a unique s = (x, y, z) ∈ S such
that p¯s =
−−−−−−−−−−→
(C \ {x, y, z})s  y  z  x; we call that unique s corresponding to every x ∈ X
sx. We now claim that T = {sx : x ∈ X} forms a three dimensional matching of I ′. First
notice that, |T | = m since there is exactly one sx for every x ∈ X . If T does not form a
three dimensional matching of I ′, then there exists a candidate in Y ∪ Z whose Copeland
score is strictly more than the Copeland score of c (which is 10m). However, this contradicts
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our assumption that c is a co-winner in P¯ ∪Q. Hence T forms a three dimensional matching
of I and thus I is a Yes instance. J
I Theorem 12. [?] The Possible Winner problem is in P for the Copeland0 and Copeland1
voting rules if the number of undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote is at most 1.
Proof. Let us prove the result for α = 0. The proof for α = 1 case is similar. Let the input
instance of Possible Winner be (C,P, c) where every partial vote in P has at most one
pair of candidates whose ordering is undetermined. We consider an extension P ′ of P where
the candidate c is placed as high as possible. For every two candidates x, y ∈ C, let V{x,y} be
the set of partial votes in P ′ where the ordering of x and y is undetermined. Let B be the set
of pairs of vertices {x, y} for which it is possible to make x tie with y by fixing the ordering
of x and y in the votes in V{x,y}. For every {x, y} ∈ B, we also fix the orderings of x and y
in P ′ in such a way that x and y tie. We first observe that the Possible Winner instance
(C,P, c) is a Yes instance if and only if (C,P ′, c) is a Yes instance since every vote in P has
at most one pair of candidates whose ordering is undetermined. Let the Copeland score of c
in P ′ be s(c). We put every unordered pair of candidates {x, y} ⊂ C \{c} in a set A if setting
x preferred over y in every vote V{x,y} makes x defeat y and setting y preferred over x in
every vote in V{x,y} makes y defeat x in pairwise election. Note that A can be computed in
polynomial amount of time. Now we construct the following instance I = (G = (U , E), s, t) of
the maximum s− t flow problem. The vertex set U of G consists of two special vertices s and
t, one vertex u{x,y} for every {x, y} in A, one vertex ua for every candidate a ∈ C. For every
candidate x ∈ C \ {c}, let nx be the number of candidates in C whom x defeats pairwise in
every extension of P ′. Observe that nx can be computed in polynomial amount of time. We
answer No if there exists a x ∈ C \ {c} whose nx > s(c) since the Copeland score of x is
more than the Copeland score of c in every extension of P ′ and thus c cannot co-win. For
every {x, y} ∈ A, we add one edge from u{x,y} to x, one edge from u{x,y} to y, and one edge
from s to u{x,y} each with capacity 1. For every vertex ux with nx < s(c), we add an edge
from x to t with capacity s(c)−nx. We claim that the Possible Winner instance (C,P ′, c)
is a Yes instance if and only if there is a flow from s to t in G of size ∑x∈C(nx − s(c)). The
proof of correctness follows easily from the construction of G. J
I Lemma 20. [?] The Possible Winner problem is NP-complete for the Copelandα voting
rule even if the number of undetermined pairs in every vote is at most 1 for every α ∈ (0, 1/2].
Proof. The Possible Winner problem for the Copelandα voting rule is clearly in NP. To
prove NP-hardness of Possible Winner, we reduce Possible Winner from (3, B2)–SAT.
Let I be an instance of (3, B2)–SAT, over the variables V = {x1, . . . , xn} and with clauses
T = {c1, . . . , cm}. We construct an instance I ′ of Possible Winner from I as follows.
Set of candidates: C = {xi, x¯i, di : i ∈ [n]}∪{ci : i ∈ [m]}∪{c}∪G, where G = {g1, . . . , gmn}
For every i ∈ [n], let us consider the following votes p1xi , p2xi , p1x¯i , p2x¯i .
p1xi , p
2
xi : xi  di  others, p1x¯i , p2x¯i : x¯i  di  others
Using p1xi , p
2
xi , p
1
x¯i , p
2
x¯i , we define the partial votes p
1′
xi , p
2′
xi , p
1′
x¯i , p
2′
x¯i as follows.
p1′xi , p
2′
xi : p
1
xi \ {(xi, di)}, p1′x¯i , p2′x¯i : p1x¯i \ {(x¯i, di)}
Let a clause cj involves the literals `1j , `2j , `3j . For every j ∈ [m], let us consider the
following votes qj(`1j ), qj(`2j ), qj(`3j ).
qj(`kj ) : cj  `kj  others,∀k ∈ [3]
CVIT 2016
23:28 On the Exact Amount of Missing Information that makes Finding Possible Winners Hard
Using qj(`1j ), qj(`2j ), qj(`3j ), we define the partial votes q′j(`1j ), q′j(`2j ), q′j(`3j ) as follows.
q′j(`kj ) : qj(`kj ) \ {(cj , `kj )},∀k ∈ [3]
Let us define P = ∪i∈[n]{p1xi , p2xi , p1x¯i , p2x¯i}∪j∈[m]{qj(`1j ), qj(`2j ), qj(`3j )} and P ′ = ∪i∈[n]{p1′xi , p2′xi , p1′x¯i , p2′x¯i}∪j∈[m]
{q′j(`1j), q′j(`2j), q′j(`3j)}. There exists a set of complete votes Q of size polynomial in n and
m which realizes Table 8 [18]. All the wins and defeats in Table 8 are by a margin of 2.
We now define the instance I ′ of Possible Winner to be (C,P ′ ∪ Q, c). Notice that the
number of undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote in I ′ is at most 1. This finishes
the description of the Possible Winner instance. We claim that I and I ′ are equivalent.
Candidates Copelandα score Winning against Losing against Tie with
c
(2n+m)α
+n+ 3mn/4 G
′ ⊂ G, |G′| = n+ 3mn/4 G \G
′, |G′| = n+ 3mn/4
di, ∀i ∈ [n]
xi, x¯i∀i ∈ [n]
cj∀j ∈ [m]
xi, ∀i ∈ [n] (2n+m)α+n+ 3mn/4
G′′ ⊂ G, |G′′| = 3mn/4
di∀i ∈ [n] G \ (G
′ ∪G′′)
c,G′ ⊂ G, |G′| = m
xj , ∀j ∈ [n] \ {i}
x¯j∀j ∈ [n]
x¯i, ∀i ∈ [n] (2n+m)α+n+ 3mn/4
G′′ ⊂ G, |G′′| = 3mn/4
di∀i ∈ [n] G \ (G
′ ∪G′′)
c,G′ ⊂ G, |G′| = m
x¯j , ∀j ∈ [n] \ {i}
xj∀j ∈ [n]
cj , ∀j ∈ [m] (2n+m− 1)α+n+ 3mn/4 + 1
xi, x¯i∀i ∈ [n]
G′ ⊂ G, |G′| = 3mn/4− n+ 1
G \ (G′ ∪G′′)
di, ∀i ∈ [n]
c
cj∀j ∈ [m] \ {i}
G′′ ⊂ G, |G′′| = 2n− 1
di, i ∈ [n] (2n+m)α+n+ 3mn/4− 1
c, cj , ∀j ∈ [m]
G′′ ⊂ G, |G′′| = 3mn/4−m+ n− 2
xi, x¯i∀i ∈ [n]
G \ (G′ ∪G′′) G
′ ⊂ G, |G′| = 2n+m
gi, ∀i ∈ [mn] < 3mn/4 ∀j ∈ {i+ k : k ∈ [b(mn−1)/2c]
Table 8 Summary of initial Copelandα scores of the candidates. All the wins and defeats in the
table are by a margin of 2.
In the forward direction, suppose that I be a Yes instance of (3, B2)–SAT. Then there
exists an assignment x∗i of variables xi for all i ∈ [n] to 0 or 1 that satisfies all the clauses
cj , j ∈ [m]. For every i ∈ [n], we extend the partial votes p1′xi , p2′xi , p1′x¯i , p2′x¯i to the complete
votes p¯1xi , p¯
2
xi , p¯
1
x¯i , p¯
2
x¯i as follows.
p¯1xi , p¯
2
xi =
{
xi  di  others x∗i = 0
di  xi  others x∗i = 1
; p¯1x¯i , p¯
2
x¯i =
{
x¯i  di  others x∗i = 1
di  x¯i  others x∗i = 0
Let cj be a clause involving literals `1j , `2j , `3j and let us assume, without loss of generality,
that the assignment {x∗i }i∈[n] makes the literal `3j 1. For every j ∈ [m], we extend the partial
votes q′j(`1j ), q′j(`2j ), q′j(`3j ) to the complete votes q¯j(`1j ), q¯j(`2j ), q¯j(`3j ) as follows.
q¯j(`3j ) = `3j  cj  others, q¯j(`kj ) = cj  `kj  others,∀k ∈ [2]
We consider the extension of P ′ to P¯ = ∪i∈[n]{p¯1xi , p¯2xi , p¯1x¯i , p¯2x¯i}∪j∈[m]{q¯j(`1j ), q¯j(`2j ), q¯j(`3j )}.
We observe that c is a co-winner in the profile P¯ ∪ Q since the Copelandα score of c, di for
every i ∈ [n], and cj for every j ∈ [m] in P¯ ∪Q is (2n+m)α+n+ 3mn/4, the Copelandα score
of xi and x¯i for every i ∈ [n] is at most (2n+m)α+ n+ 3mn/4 since every literal appears in
at most two clauses and α 6 1/2, and the Copelandα score of the candidates in G in P¯ ∪ Q is
strictly less than 3mn/4.
In the reverse direction we suppose that the Possible Winner instance I ′ be a Yes
instance. Then there exists an extension of the set of partial votes P ′ to a set of complete
votes P¯ such that c is a co-winner in P¯ ∪ Q. Let us call the extension of the partial votes
p1′xi , p
2′
xi , p
1′
x¯i , p
2′
x¯i in P¯ p¯1xi , p¯2xi , p¯1x¯i , p¯2x¯i and the extension of the partial votes q′j(`1j ), q′j(`2j ), q′j(`3j )
in P¯ q¯j(`1j), q¯j(`2j), q¯j(`3j). Now we notice that the Copelandα score of c in P¯ ∪ Q is (2n+
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m)α + n + 3mn/4 since the relative ordering of c with respect to every other candidate is
already fixed in P ′ ∪ Q. We observe that the Copelandα score of di for every i ∈ [n] can
increase by at most 1 from P ∪Q without defeating c. Hence it cannot be the case that di is
preferred over xi in both p¯1xi and p¯
2
xi and di is preferred over x¯i in both p¯
1
x¯i and p¯
2
x¯i . We
define x∗i to be 1 if di is preferred over xi in both p¯1xi and p¯
2
xi and 0 otherwise. We claim
that {x∗i }i∈[n] is a satisfying assignment to all the clauses in T . Suppose not, then there
exists a clause ci which is not satisfied by the assignment{x∗i }i∈[n]. Hence, for c to co-win in
P¯ ∪ Q, the Copelandα score of cj for every j ∈ [m] must decrease by at least (1− α) from
P ∪Q. Now let us consider the candidate ci. Hence there must be a candidate `i such that
the literal `i appear in the clause ci and the candidate `i is preferred over the candidate ci
in q¯i(`i). However, this increases the score of `i by α. Also, since the assignment {x∗i }i∈[n]
makes `i false (by our assumption, the clause ci is not satisfied), the Copelandα score of
`i in P¯ ∪ Q is strictly more than (2n+m)α+ n+ 3mn/4 since α > 0. This contradicts our
assumption that c co-wins in P¯ ∪ Q. Hence {x∗i }i∈[n] is a satisfying assignment of the clause
in T and thus I is a Yes instance. J
I Lemma 21. [?] The Possible Winner problem is NP-complete for the Copelandα voting
rule even if the number of undetermined pairs in every vote is at most 1 for every α ∈ [1/2, 1).
Proof. The Possible Winner problem for the Copelandα voting rule is clearly in NP. To
prove NP-hardness of Possible Winner, we reduce Possible Winner from (3, B2)–SAT.
Let I be an instance of (3, B2)–SAT, over the variables V = {x1, . . . , xn} and with clauses
T = {c1, . . . , cm}. We construct an instance I ′ of Possible Winner from I as follows.
Set of candidates: C = {xi, x¯i, di : i ∈ [n]}∪{ci : i ∈ [m]}∪{c}∪G, where G = {g1, . . . , gmn}
For every i ∈ [n], let us consider the following votes p1xi , p2xi , p1x¯i , p2x¯i .
p1xi , p
2
xi : xi  di  others
p1x¯i , p
2
x¯i : x¯i  di  others
Using p1xi , p
2
xi , p
1
x¯i , p
2
x¯i , we define the partial votes p
1′
xi , p
2′
xi , p
1′
x¯i , p
2′
x¯i as follows.
p1′xi , p
2′
xi : p
1
xi \ {(xi, di)}
p1′x¯i , p
2′
x¯i : p
1
x¯i \ {(x¯i, di)}
Let a clause cj involves the literals `1j , `2j , `3j . For every j ∈ [m], let us consider the
following votes qj(`1j ), qj(`2j ), qj(`3j ).
qj(`kj ) : cj  `kj  others,∀k ∈ [3]
Using qj(`1j ), qj(`2j ), qj(`3j ), we define the partial votes q′j(`1j ), q′j(`2j ), q′j(`3j ) as follows.
q′j(`kj ) : qj(`kj ) \ {(cj , `kj )},∀k ∈ [3]
Let us define P = ∪i∈[n]{p1xi , p2xi , p1x¯i , p2x¯i}∪j∈[m]{qj(`1j ), qj(`2j ), qj(`3j )} and P ′ = ∪i∈[n]{p1′xi , p2′xi , p1′x¯i , p2′x¯i}∪j∈[m]
{q′j(`1j ), q′j(`2j ), q′j(`3j )}. There exists a set of complete votes Q of size polynomial in n and m
with the following properties [18].
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– Let G3mn/4 ⊂ G such that G3mn/4 = 3mn/4. Then we have ∀i ∈ [n],DP∪Q(xi, xj) =
DP∪Q(xi, x¯k) = DP∪Q(xi, c) = DP∪Q(xi, cj′) = 0,∀j ∈ [n]\{i}∀k ∈ [n],∀j′ ∈ [m],DP∪Q(xi, g) =
2,DP∪Q(xi, dk) = 2,DP∪Q(xi, g′) = −2,∀k ∈ [n]∀g ∈ G3mn/4∀g′ ∈ G \G3mn/4
– Let G3mn/4 ⊂ G such that G3mn/4 = 3mn/4. Then we have ∀i ∈ [n],DP∪Q(x¯i, x¯j) =
DP∪Q(x¯i, xk) = DP∪Q(x¯i, c) = DP∪Q(x¯i, cj) = 0,∀j ∈ [n]\{i}∀k ∈ [n],∀j ∈ [m],DP∪Q(x¯i, g) =
2,DP∪Q(x¯i, dk) = 2,DP∪Q(x¯i, g′) = −2,∀k ∈ [n]∀g ∈ G3mn/4∀g′ ∈ G \G3mn/4
– Let Gn+3mn/4 ⊂ G such that |Gn+3mn/4| = n + 3mn/4. Then we have DP∪Q(c, xi) =
DP∪Q(c, x¯i) = DP∪Q(c, cj) = 0,∀i ∈ [n]∀j ∈ [m],DP∪Q(c, g) = DP∪Q(g′, c) = 2,∀g ∈
Gn+3mn/4, g
′ ∈ G \Gn+3mn/4
– Let Gn+3mn/4 ⊂ G such that |Gn+3mn/4| = n + 3mn/4, g¯ ∈ G \ Gn+3mn/4. Then we have
∀i ∈ [m],DP∪Q(ci, cj) = DP∪Q(ci, c) = DP∪Q(ci, xk) = DP∪Q(ci, x¯k) = DP∪Q(ci, g¯) =
0,∀j ∈ [m] \ {i}∀k ∈ [n],DP∪Q(ci, g) = DP∪Q(g′′, ci) = DP∪Q(dj , ci) = 2,∀g′ ∈
Gn+3mn/4∀g′′ ∈ G \Gn+3mn/4∀j ∈ [n]
– Let G2n+m, G3mn/4−m+n−2 ⊂ G such that |G2n+m| = 2n+m,G3mn/4−m+n−2 = 3mn/4−
m + n − 2, G2n+m ∩ G3mn/4−m+n−2 = ∅. Then we have ∀i ∈ [n],DP∪Q(di, g) = 0,∀g ∈
G2n+m,DP∪Q(di, g′) = DP∪Q(g′′, di) = 2,∀g′ ∈ G3mn/4−m+n−2, g′′ ∈ G \ (G2n+m ∪
G3mn/4−m+n−2)
– ∀i ∈ [mn],DP∪Q(gj , gi) = 2∀j ∈ {i+ k : k ∈ [b(mn−1)/2c]}
All the pairwise margins which are not specified above is 0. We summarize the Copelandα
score of every candidate in C from P ∪ Q in Table 9. We now define the instance I ′ of
Possible Winner to be (C,P ′ ∪ Q, c). Notice that the number of undetermined pairs of
candidates in every vote in I ′ is at most 1. This finishes the description of the Possible
Winner instance. We claim that I and I ′ are equivalent.
Candidates Copelandα score Winning against Losing against Tie with
c
(2n+m)α
+n+ 3mn/4 G
′ ⊂ G, |G′| = n+ 3mn/4 G \G
′, |G′| = n+ 3mn/4
di, ∀i ∈ [n]
xi, x¯i∀i ∈ [n]
cj∀j ∈ [m]
xi, ∀i ∈ [n] (2n+m)α+n+ 3mn/4
G′′ ⊂ G, |G′′| = 3mn/4
di∀i ∈ [n] G \ (G
′ ∪G′′)
c, cj∀j ∈ [m]
xj ,∀j ∈ [n] \ {i}
x¯j∀j ∈ [n]
x¯i, ∀i ∈ [n] (2n+m)α+n+ 3mn/4
G′′ ⊂ G, |G′′| = 3mn/4
di∀i ∈ [n] G \ (G
′ ∪G′′)
c, cj∀j ∈ [m]
x¯j ,∀j ∈ [n] \ {i}
xj∀j ∈ [n]
cj , ∀j ∈ [m] (2n+m+ 1)α+n+ 3mn/4 G
′ ⊂ G, |G′| = 3mn/4 + n G \ (G
′ ∪G′′)
di, ∀i ∈ [n]
c, xi, x¯i∀i ∈ [n]
cj∀j ∈ [m] \ {i}
G′′ ⊂ G, |G′′| = 1
di, i ∈ [n] (2n+m)α+n+ 3mn/4− 1
c, cj , ∀j ∈ [m]
G′′ ⊂ G, |G′′| = 3mn/4−m+ n− 2
xi, x¯i∀i ∈ [n]
G \ (G′ ∪G′′) G
′ ⊂ G, |G′| = 2n+m
gi, ∀i ∈ [mn] < 3mn/4 ∀j ∈ {i+ k : k ∈ [b(mn−1)/2c]
Table 9 Summary of initial Copelandα scores of the candidates
In the forward direction, suppose that I be a Yes instance of (3, B2)–SAT. Then there
exists an assignment x∗i of variables xi for all i ∈ [n] to 0 or 1 that satisfies all the clauses
cj , j ∈ [m]. For every i ∈ [n], we extend the partial votes p1′xi , p2′xi , p1′x¯i , p2′x¯i to the complete
votes p¯1xi , p¯
2
xi , p¯
1
x¯i , p¯
2
x¯i as follows.
p¯1xi , p¯
2
xi =
{
xi  di  others x∗i = 0
di  xi  others x∗i = 1
p¯1x¯i , p¯
2
x¯i =
{
x¯i  di  others x∗i = 1
di  x¯i  others x∗i = 0
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Let cj be a clause involving literals `1j , `2j , `3j and let us assume, without loss of generality,
that the assignment x∗i i∈[n] makes the literal `3j 1. For every j ∈ [m], we extend the partial
votes q′j(`1j ), q′j(`2j ), q′j(`3j ) to the complete votes q¯j(`1j ), q¯j(`2j ), q¯j(`3j ) as follows.
q¯j(`3j ) = `3j  cj  others, q¯j(`kj ) = cj  `kj  others,∀k ∈ [2]
We consider the extension of P ′ to P¯ = ∪i∈[n]{p¯1xi , p¯2xi , p¯1x¯i , p¯2x¯i}∪j∈[m]{q¯j(`1j ), q¯j(`2j ), q¯j(`3j )}.
We observe that c is a co-winner in the profile P¯ ∪ Q since the Copelandα score of c, di for
every i ∈ [n], and cj for every j ∈ [m] in P¯ ∪ Q is (2n + m)α + n + 3mn/4, the Copelandα
score of xi, x¯i for every i ∈ [n] is at most (2n+m)α+ n+ 3mn/4 since every literal appears
in at most two clauses and 1− α 6 1/2, and the Copelandα score of the candidates in G in
P¯ ∪ Q is strictly less than 3mn/4.
In the reverse direction suppose the Possible Winner instance I ′ be a Yes instance.
Then there exists an extension of the set of partial votes P ′ to a set of complete votes
P¯ such that c is a co-winner in P¯ ∪ Q. Let us call the extension of the partial votes
p1′xi , p
2′
xi , p
1′
x¯i , p
2′
x¯i in P¯ p¯1xi , p¯2xi , p¯1x¯i , p¯2x¯i and the extension of the partial votes q′j(`1j ), q′j(`2j ), q′j(`3j )
in P¯ q¯j(`1j), q¯j(`2j), q¯j(`3j). Now we notice that the Copelandα score of c in P¯ ∪ Q is (2n+
m)α + n + 3mn/4 since the relative ordering of c with respect to every other candidate is
already fixed in P ′ ∪ Q. We observe that the Copelandα score of di for every i ∈ [n] can
increase by at most 1 from P ∪Q. Hence it cannot be the case that di is preferred over xi
in both p¯1xi and p¯
2
xi and di is preferred over x¯i in both p¯
1
x¯i and p¯
2
x¯i . We define x
∗
i to be 1
if di is preferred over xi in both p¯1xi and p¯
2
xi and 0 otherwise. We claim that {x∗i }i∈[n] is a
satisfying assignment to all the clauses in T . Suppose not, then there exists a clause ci which
is not satisfied by the assignment{x∗i }i∈[n]. The Copelandα score of cj for every j ∈ [m] in
P¯ ∪ Q is (2n+m+ 1)α+ n+ 3mn/4. Hence, for c to co-win in P¯ ∪ Q, the Copelandα score
of cj for every j ∈ [m] must decrease by at least α from P ∪ Q. Now let us consider the
candidate ci. There must be a candidate `i such that the literal `i appear in the clause ci
and `i is preferred over the candidate ci in q¯i(`i). However, this increases the score of `i by
α. Also, since the assignment {x∗i }i∈[n] makes `i false (since by assumption, the clause ci is
not satisfied), the Copelandα score of `i in P¯ ∪Q is strictly more than (2n+m)α+n+ 3mn/4
since α < 0. This contradicts the assumption that c co-wins in P¯ ∪ Q. Hence {x∗i }i∈[n] is a
satisfying assignment of the clause in T and thus I is a Yes instance. J
I Theorem 18. [?] The Possible Winner problem is in P for the maximin voting rule if
the number of undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote is at most 1.
Proof. Let the input instance of Possible Winner be (C,P, c) where every partial vote
in P has at most one pair of candidates whose ordering is undetermined. We consider an
extension P ′ of P where the candidate c is placed as high as possible. Notice that the
maximin score of c in every extension of P ′ is same and known since the relative ordering of
c with other candidates is fixed in P ′. Let the maximin score of c in P ′ be s(c). We now
observe that, if c is a weak Condorcet winner, that is s(c) > 0, then c is a co-winner in every
extension of P ′ and thus (C,P, c) is a Yes instance. Otherwise, let us assume s(c) < 0. For
any two candidates x, y ∈ C \ {c}, let Vx,y be the set of partial votes in P ′ where the ordering
between the candidates x and y is undetermined. Since every partial vote in P ′ has at most
one undetermined pair, for every x1, x2, y1, y2 ∈ C \ {c}, Vx1,x2 ∩ Vy1,y2 = ∅.
We construct the following flow graph G. We have a vertex for every subset {x, y} ⊆ C\{c}
of candidates other than c of size two, a vertex for every candidate other than c, and two
special vertces s and t. If making x prefer over y in every Vx,y makes D(x, y) < s(c), then
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we add a directed edge from the vertex {x, y} to x of capacity one. Similarly, if making
y prefer over x in every Vx,y makes D(y, x) < s(c), then we add a directed edge from the
vertex {x, y} to y of capacity one. We add an edge of capacity one from s to every vertex
corresponding to the vertex {x, y} for every {x, y} ⊆ C \ {c}. Let C¯ ⊆ C \ {c} be the set of
candidates x in C such that there exists a candidate y ∈ C \ {x} such that D(x, y) 6 s(c) in
every extension of P ′; note that this is easy to check by guessing the candidate y. We add an
edge of capacity one from the vertex corresponding to every candidate in C \ C¯ to t. We claim
that the (C,P ′, c) is a Yes instance if and only if there is a s− t flow in G of amount |C \ C¯|.
Suppose (C,P ′, c) is a Yes instance. Consider an extension P¯ of P ′ where c co-wins.
Let the extension of Vx,y in P¯ be V¯x,y. For every candidate x ∈ C \ C¯, there exists a
candidate y ∈ C \ {c} such that D(x, y) 6 s(c); we call that candidate d(x) (if there are
more than one such y, we pick any one). Then we assign a flow of unit one along the path
s → {x, d(x)} → x → t. For any two candidates x, y ∈ C \ C¯, since at most one of D(x, y)
and D(y, x) be less than 0 (and thus at most one of them can be 6 s(c)), we never assign
flows to both the paths s → {x, y} → x → t and s → {x, y} → y → t. Hence the flow is
valid. Since every vertex in C \ C¯ sends exactly one unit of flow to t, the total amount of flow
in G is |C \ C¯|.
In the reverse direction, suppose there exists a s− t flow f in G of amount |C \ C¯|. Then,
for every vertex x ∈ C \ C¯, there exists a d(x) ∈ C \ {c, x} such that f assigns a one unit of
flow from the vertex {x, d(x)} to x. For every candidate x ∈ C \ C¯, we make d(x)  x in
the completion of every vote in Vx,d(x). We fix the ordering of all other pairs of candidates
arbitrarily. We use V¯ to denote the resulting completion of P ′. By construction of G, c is a
co-winner in V¯. J
I Theorem 19. [?] The Possible Winner problem is NP-complete for the Bucklin voting
rule even if the number of undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote is at most 2, and
is in P if the number of undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote is at most 1.
Proof. We first establish the hardness result. The Possible Winner problem for the
Bucklin voting rule is clearly in NP. To prove NP-hardness of Possible Winner, we reduce
Possible Winner from Three Dimensional Matching. Let I = (X ∪ Y ∪ Z,S) be an
arbitrary instance of Three Dimensional Matching. Let |X | = |Y| = |Z| = m, |S| = t,
and U = X ∪ Y ∪ Z. For every a ∈ U , let fa be the number of sets in S where a belongs,
that is fa = |{s ∈ S : a ∈ s}|. We assume, without loss of generality, that fa 6 3 for every
a ∈ U since Three Dimensional Matching is NP-complete even with this restriction [14].
We also assume without loss of generality that t > 3m (otherwise we duplicate the sets in S).
We construct an instance I ′ of Possible Winner from I as follows.
Set of candidates: C = X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ {c} ∪ G1 ∪ G2 ∪ G3, where |G1| = |G2| = |G3| = 3m
For every s = (x, y, z) ∈ S, let us consider the following vote ps.
ps = (U \ {x, y, z})  x  y  z  others
Using ps, we define a partial vote p′s as follows.
p′s = ps \ {(x, y), (x, z)}
Let us define P = ∪s∈Sps and P ′ = ∪s∈Sp′s. For i ∈ [3] and j ∈ [3m], let Gji denote an
arbitrary subset of Gi of size j. We add the following set Q of complete votes as in Table 10.
We summarize the number of times every candidate gets placed within top 3m− 1 and
3m− 2 positions in P ∪Q in Table 11. We now define the instance I ′ of Possible Winner
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∀z ∈ Z, fz − 1 copies of c  G3m−41  z  others
1 copy of c  G3m−31  z  others
∀y ∈ Y, fy copies of G3m−31  y  c  others
∀x ∈ X , 3 copies of (X \ {x})  Y  Gm−12  x  others t− 3m copies of X  Y  Gm2  others
t− 1 copies of Z  G2m2  others 1 copy of Z  X  Gm2  others
t copies of c  X  Y  Gm2  others t− 1 copies of c  Y  Z  Gm3  others
1 copy of c  Z  X  Gm3  others t− 2 copies of Z  X  Gm3  others
2 copies of c  Z  X  Gm3  others 1 copy of Z  X  Gm3  others
Table 10 We add the following set of complete votes Q.
to be (C,P ′ ∪ Q, c). The total number of votes in I ′ is 8t+ 1. Notice that the number of
undetermined pairs of candidates in every vote in I ′ is at most 2. This finishes the description
of the Possible Winner instance. We claim that I and I ′ are equivalent.
Candidates Top 3m− 1 positions Top 3m− 2 positions
c 4t+ 2 3t+ 2
x ∈ X 4t+ 3 4t
y ∈ Y 6 4t+ 2 4t− 1
z ∈ Z 4t+ 1 4t
g ∈ G1 ∪ G2 ∪ G3 < 4t < 4t
Table 11 Number of times every candidate is initially placed within top 3m − 1 and 3m − 2
positions.
In the forward direction, suppose that I be a Yes instance of Three Dimensional
Matching. Then there exists a collection ofm sets S ′ ⊂ S in S such that ∪A∈S′A = X∪Y∪Z.
We extend the partial vote p′s to p¯s as follows for s ∈ S.
p¯s =
{
(U \ {x, y, z})  y  z  x  others s ∈ S ′
(U \ {x, y, z})  x  y  z  others s /∈ S ′
We consider the extension of P to P¯ = ∪s∈S p¯s. We claim that c is a co-winner in the
profile P¯ ∪Q since c gets majority within top 3m− 1 positions with 4t+ 2 votes, whereas no
candidate gets majority within top 3m− 2 positions and every candidate in C is placed at
most 4t+ 2 times within top 3m− 1 positions.
In the reverse direction suppose the Possible Winner instance I ′ be a Yes instance.
Then there exists an extension of the set of partial votes P ′ to a set of complete votes P¯ such
that c is a co-winner in P¯ ∪ Q. Let us call the extension of p′s in P¯ p¯s. First we notice that
for c to co-win, every x ∈ X must be placed at positions outside top 3m− 1 since otherwise
x will receive more votes that c within top 3m − 1 positions. Also observe that the only
way to place x outside the top 3m − 1 positions in the votes in p¯s for some s = (x, y, z)
is to put x, y and x at 3m, 3m − 2, and 3m − 1 positions respectively. We consider the
subset S ′ ⊆ S of S whose corresponding vote completions place x at 3mth position; that is
S ′ = {s = (x, y, z) ∈ S : p¯s = (U \ {x, y, z})  y  z  x  others}. From the discussion
above, we have |S ′| > m. Now we observe that every y ∈ Y can be placed at most once at
the (3m − 2)th position in the votes in {p¯s : s ∈ S ′}; otherwise y will get majority within
top 3m − 2 positions and c cannot win the election. Also every z ∈ Z can be placed at
most once at the (3m− 1)th position in the votes in {p¯s : s ∈ S ′}; otherwise z will receive
strictly more than 4t+ 2 votes within top 3m− 1 positions and thus c cannot win. Hence,
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every x ∈ X , y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z belong in exactly one set in S ′ and thus S ′ forms a three
dimensional matching. Hence I is a Yes instance.
We now turn to the polynomially solvable scenario claimed in the theorem. Let the input
instance of Possible Winner be (C,P, c) where every partial vote in P has at most one
pair of candidates whose ordering is undetermined. We consider an extension P ′ of P where
the candidate c is placed as high as possible. Let k be the minimum integer such that c
gets majority within top k positions. Now we can use the polynomial time algorithm for the
k-approval voting rule to solve this instance. J
